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DATA PROTECTION CONSIDERATIONS IN EU COMPETITION LAW: 
FUNNEL OR STRAITJACKET FOR INNOVATION?  
DR. NICOLO ZINGALES * 
[forthcoming in P. Nihoul and P. Van Cleynenbreugel, The Role of Innovation in 
Competition Analysis (Edward Elgar, 2018)] 
As technological advancement dramatically increases the opportunities and reduces the 
costs for data collection and processing, a variety of companies have been seizing those 
opportunities to offer more targeted products or services. The pattern is simple: data on 
consumer identities, preferences and behavior is collected from a variety of sources and 
collated into comprehensive databases, which are then used to identify relevant consumer 
characteristics and enable a better targeting. The potential of garnering and using data to 
improve productivity and customization is indeed a central promise of the so called “big 
data revolution”1, which tends to favor actors with greater capacity to collect, retain and 
analyze consumer data. In this context, where data constitutes a valuable input for the 
attainment of efficiencies and a driver of competitive dynamics, competition law 
inevitably complements data protection law as an instrument to prevent entities with 
access to strategic datasets to abuse their position to the detriment of consumers, and 
individuals more generally.  
Needless to say, these instruments differ significantly in their goals and methods of 
operation. Most importantly for purposes of this chapter, their differences are significant 
when it comes to the evaluation of the legal justifications offered by undertakings for a 
range of actions they take in relation to those datasets. A comparison of the legal tests 
applied in these two different areas in the EU illustrates two contrasting approaches to the 
incorporation of innovation into legal analysis, with important consequences for 
competition enforcement. The significance of those differences implies that great caution 
																																																								
* Lecturer in competition and information law, Sussex University. Email N.zingales@sussex.ac.uk.  
1	V. Mayer- Schonberger, Big Data: A Revolution That Will Transform How We Live, Work, and Think 
(Eamon Dolan/Mariner Books 2014).	
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3158008 
																														
	 2	
should be exercised in the implementation of rising “integrationist” theories of data 
protection and competition law. This chapter exposes a blind spot in that emerging 
integrationist trend, suggesting that the process used to collapse data protection 
considerations into a competition assessment has consequential implications for the 
treatment of “data-driven innovation” and “data protection innovation”. Having 
illustrated the deficiencies of the procedures currently in place, and recognizing that the 
fundamental right to data protection cannot be ignored by competition enforcers, it calls 
for the definition of a comprehensive framework of cooperation between competition and 
data protection authorities. 
 
Section 1 describes the ecosystem created by the valorization of personal data, in 
particular explaining the two types of innovation introduced by this ecosystem: data-
driven innovation and data protection innovation. Section 2 observes that the current 
framework for innovation defenses in EU competition law is deficient when it comes to 
these new forms of innovation. Section 3 provides an overview of the legal basis for data-
driven innovation in EU data protection law. Section 4 maps out the possible intersection 
between data protection and competition analysis in this regard, identifying different 
needs and scenarios of cooperation between competition and data protection authorities. 
Finally, Section 5 summarizes the key points of this contribution and concludes. 
1. The rise of data innovation 
Though it might not be apparent yet, we are living what the World Economic Forum has 
called the fourth industrial revolution 2 . After the breakthrough technological 
advancements generated by the mechanization of production, electricity and automation, 
we are now in the midst of a transition to a world where digital technologies are 
becoming embedded into physical objects, enabling the control or monitoring of their 
activity through the use of algorithms.  While part of this transition can be ascribed to the 
third industrial revolution, which consisted in the automation of production through 
electronics and information technologies, two distinctive features suggest that we are 
																																																								
2 Klaus Schwab, ‘The Fourth Industrial Revolution: what it means, how to respond’, World Economic 
Forum (14 January 2016). Available at <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/01/the-fourth-industrial-
revolution-what-it-means-and-how-to-respond/> accessed 10 September 2016. 
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witnessing a different phenomenon: the innovation produced over the last few years by 
this technological paradigm is occurring at a much higher pace, and is affecting and 
increasingly disrupting all industries3. 
This shift has been dubbed “industry 4.0”, which involves the redefining the dynamics of 
manufacturing along the above-mentioned lines. This process is enabled by a number of 
factors. Without doubts, the increased capacity and the lower cost of computing, the 
subsequent deployment of increasingly intelligent robots and machines and the expansion 
of wireless communications and networks play a pivotal role in this ecosystem4.  But it 
would be disingenuous to overlook that this technological advancement is fueled by the 
boost in collection and processing of data, generated by the continuous interaction of 
humans with machines and between machines themselves. With the rise of artificial 
intelligence and the exponential growth of so called “big data”5, increasingly advanced 
techniques of data analytics are being put to the service of businesses across a variety of 
sectors. Data and the ability to make sense of them constitute an essential asset to enable 
businesses to adjust their offerings to demand and attain one of the key attributes of 
industry 4.0: mass customization6. 
Data innovation has made its strides outside manufacturing, as well. Researchers from 
MIT reported that companies in the top third of their industry in the use of data-driven 
decision making were, on average, 5% more productive and 6% more profitable than 
their competitors. 7  In the B2C environment, digitization and connectivity have 
transformed the way in which products and services are sold and marketed to consumers. 
																																																								
3 Id. 
4  European Parliament, “Industry 4.0”, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2015/568337/EPRS_BRI(2015)568337_EN.pdf  
5 Although the definition of «big data» is contested, there seems to be unanimity with regard to its reference 
to the three «Vs», i.e. Velocity, Variety and Volume. .It is generally understood as referring to large 
amounts of different types of data, produced at high speed from multiple sources, whose handling and 
analysis require new and more powerful processors and algorithms. See Autorité de la Concurrence and 
Bundeskartellamt, ‘Joint Report on Competition Law and Data’ (10 May 2016), at 
http://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/doc/reportcompetitionlawanddatafinal.pdf; European Data 
Protection Supervisor, https://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/edps/Consultation/bigdata . 
6 European Parliament, supra note 4, p. 5.  
7 Andrew McAfee, Erik Brynjolfsson, ‘Big Data: The Management Revolution’ (2012) Harvard Business 
Review 61. 
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Not only does the “digital footprint” left behind by consumers when surfing online allow 
businesses to make customized offers, obtaining a better match to their preferences: 
increasingly, it enables a variety of business models dependent on advertising, which 
becomes more profitable when specifically targeted to consumer preferences. 
In sum, the current ecosystem both for production and distribution heavily depends on 
data collection and analysis, which in turn are favored by the ability of the technologies 
that we deploy to automatically generate data. However, this seemingly virtuous circle 
finds important limits in its reliance on personal data, i.e. any information relating to an 
identified or identifiable individual8. The individuals to whom those data relate (so called 
“data subjects”) enjoy a panoply of rights with regard to the processing (a word that 
refers broadly to “any operation or set of operations performed upon personal data”9) and 
are entitled to hold data processing actors liable for breaches of those rights and of the 
general principles of data protection, as well as prevent non-compliant processing. Since 
the Lisbon Treaty, rights and principles of data protection law are firmly grounded on the 
fundamental right to data protection enshrined in article 8 of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights10. Moreover, the increasing salience of data protection law in our 
society is generating a compliance culture, evidenced by several instances of market 
players using greater privacy 11  (or the more vague term of “data ethics”) as a 
differentiator and source of competitive advantage12. 
In addition to limits arising from data protection law, the regime of data processing 
																																																								
8 See Data Protection Directive, art. 2 (a). 
9 Id. 
10 See Juliane Kokott and Christoph Sobotta, ‘The distinction between privacy and data protection in the 
jurisprudence of the CJEU and the ECtHR’ (2013) 3 (4) International Data Privacy Law, 222; Raphaël 
Gellert and Serge Gutwirth, ‘The legal construction of privacy and data protection’ (2013) 29 (5) Computer 
Law & Security Review 522; Maria Tzanou, ‘Data protection as a fundamental right next to privacy? 
‘Reconstructing’ a not so new right’ 2013(3) International Data Privacy Law 88; Orla Lynskey, The 
Foundations of EU Data Protection Law (Oxford University Press 2015), pp. 89-132. 
11 In this chapter, the term “privacy” is used as shorthand for “data privacy”, which is the international 
version of the European concept of “data protection”. The terms “privacy” and “data protection” are 
therefore used interchangeably in the text, unless specific reference is made to “privacy and data 
protection” which refer to the broader universe of the fundamental rights enshrined in article 7 and 8 of the 
EU Charter of fundamental rights. 
12 For a couple of examples in this sense see Rana Forhooar, ‘Privacy is a competitive advantage’, 
Financial Times (15 October 2017).  
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chosen by a particular company can be constrained by the operation of competition law: 
if data constitutes the lifeblood of the information economy, it should not come as 
surprise that competition authorities pay particular attention to the possible exploitative 
or exclusionary consequences of a given data processing practice. Due to the recent and 
fast-moving rise of the data-driven economy, this is a relatively unchartered area for 
competition enforcers; but surely one of increasing attention. In this ecosystem, it 
becomes important to define a consistent process for competition authorities to identify 
the benefits generated by data practices, in order to distinguish between desirable and 
undesirable conduct. This challenge also brings to the fore one important question: to 
what extent should authorities account for data protection considerations in competition 
analysis? While only scratching the surface of these broad regulatory challenges, this 
chapter aims to illustrate one specific reason why developing an answer to this question is 
important: competition and data protection law have very different mechanisms to 
account for innovation in relation to the use of data.  
To appreciate this point, it is helpful to distinguish two types of innovative data practices: 
data-driven innovation and data protection innovation. While data-driven innovation can 
be broadly characterized as the use of big data to improve production or distribution and 
better match customer preferences, data protection innovation creates market value 
through greater protection of personal data, directly responding to the concerns of 
mischiefs associated with the so called “surveillance capitalism”13. Before addressing in 
the following section how these two types of innovation can be accounted for in 
competition analysis, two disclaimers are in order: first, the focus will be exclusively on 
formal defences that can be used to advance data-related innovation in EU competition 
law, disregarding the flexibilities available within more general tools, such as market 
definition, market power and the construction of the applicable theory of harm14. This 
focus is purportedly restricted in order to illustrate the challenges in relying on the current 
																																																								
13 Shoshana Zuboff ‘Big Other: Surveillance Capitalism and the Prospects of an Information Civilization’ 
(2015) 30 Journal of Information Technology, 75. 
14 See for instance Marcus Glader, Innovation Markets and Competition Analysis: EU Competition Law 
and US (Edward Elgar, 2006). Pablo Ibáñez Colomo, ‘Restrictions on Innovation in EU Competition Law' 
European Law Review 41 (2016) 2 pp. 201-219; Howard Shelanski, ‘Information, Innovation, and 
Competition Policy for the Internet’, (2013) 161 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1663  
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instrumentarium for innovation justifications in a world where competition is entangled 
with data protection considerations. Second, the analysis is limited to data protection 
considerations in what is often referred to as antitrust analysis, although the broader term 
“competition law” will be used here. The role of data protection considerations in merger 
control is out of the scope of this contribution, due to its substantially different type of 
analysis (inherently prospective and administrative in nature) and the different form of 
integration between the two disciplines in that context.  
2. Competition law: what room for innovation considerations?  
2.1. Efficiency and the (other?) goals of competition law 
There are conflicting views in the literature and the case law concerning the aim that EU 
competition law is supposed to serve. According to the European Commission, 
competition law’s ultimate aim is to protect consumer welfare and promote the efficient 
allocation of resources15 . However, the European Court of Justice has endorsed a 
different formulation of this goal, emphasizing that competition law protects the “the 
structure of the market”16, “competition as an institution”17, or “competition as such”18. 
This formulation aligns with the conventional interpretation of the Treaty rules19, and is 
																																																								
15 See Commission Notice: Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty [2004] OJ C101/97, 
para. 13; see also Commission Notice: Guidelines on the application of Article 81 of the EC Treaty to 
technology transfer agreements [2004] OJ C101/2, para. 5. See also Victoria Daskalova, Consumer Welfare 
in EU Competition Law: What Is It (Not) About?’, 11 (1) Competition Law Review (2015) pp. 131-160 
16 See e.g. Case 85/76, Hoffman La Roche AG v Commission, [1979] ECR 461, para 91; NV Nederlandsche 
Banden Industrie Michelin v Commission of the European Communities (Michelin I), [1983] ECR 3461, 
para. 70. 
17 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, Case C-95/04, British Airways v. Commission [2007] ECR I-2331, 
para 69. 
18 See e.g. Case C-501/06 P, GlaxoSmithKline Services Unlimited tegen Commissie van de Europese 
Gemeenschappen, [2009] ECR I-09291, para. 63; ECJ, Case C-209/10, Post Danmark, 
ECLI:EU:C:2012:172, paras 21-24. 
19 See, for instance: Ioannis Lianos, ‘Some Reflections on the Question of the Goals of EU Competition 
Law’, in Ioannis Lianos and Damien Geradin (eds.) Handbook on European Competition Law: Substantive 
Aspects (Edward Elgar, 2013); Oles Andriychuk, ‘Rediscovering the Spirit of Competition: On the 
Normative Value of the Competitive Process’ (2010) 6(3) European Competition Journal 575; Eugène 
Buttigieg, Competition Law: Safeguarding the Consumer Interest. A Comparative Analysis of US Antitrust 
Law and EC Competition Law (Wouters Kluwer, 2009); Josef Drexl, Wolfgang., Kerber, Ruppercht 
Podszun (eds.), Competition Policy and the Economic Approach – Foundations and Limitations (Edward 
Elgar, 2010); Paul Nihoul, ‘Freedom of Choice’: The Emergence of a Powerful Concept in European 
Competition Law’ (2012) 3(12) Concurrences 55; Okeoghene Odudu, ‘The Wider Concerns of 
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reinforced by recent EU Commission’s references to parallel Treaty goals that found 
protection through competition law, such as supporting growth, jobs and the 
competitiveness of the EU economy and fostering a competition culture20. 
In the face of the open question in economic theory on the nature of the relationship 
between market structure and innovation21, Larouche and Schinkel submit that the EU’s 
focus on the competitive process is precisely what gives competition enforcers sufficient 
latitude to protect “innovation paths”, ensuring that firms have the ability to present new 
products and services to their customers22. Key to their argument is the recognition that 
for each success story, there are many similar undertakings that fail to win the favor of 
their customers; and that for this reason, it is important that competition law preserves the 
ability of those undertakings to “find their way to the market”23. In this sense, what has 
been called “freedom to compete”24 may constitute an important element of innovation 
policy, under the assumption that it will produce dynamic efficiencies. 
Accepting this premise, the question becomes whether this comprehensive notion of 
“competition” can be pinned down to more specific benchmarks. The debate in this 
respect has been framed as one of whether competition law should protect any value 
																																																																																																																																																																					
Competition Law’ (2010) 30 (3) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 599-613; Cristopher Townley, Article 81 
EC and Public Policy, (Hart Publishing, 2009); Ben van Rompuy, Economic Efficiency: The Sole Concern 
of Modern Antitrust Policy? Non-Efficiency Considerations under Article 101 TFEU (Wouters Kluwer, 
2012); D. Zimmer. (eds.) (2012), The Goals of Competition Law, (Edward Elgar, 2012). 
20 See Commission Staff Working Paper Accompanying the Report From The Commission on Competition 
Policy 2011, p.3; Joaquin Almunia, “Competition policy for the post-crisis world: A perspective”, 
Speech/14/34 of 17th January 2014 delivered in Bruges, Belgium. At http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_SPEECH-14-34_en.htm . For more detail, see Victoria Daskalova, ‘Consumer Welfare in EU 
Competition Law: what is it (not) about?, (2015) (1) The Competition Law Review 11, 14.  
21 See in particular Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (Harper & Row, 1947); 
Kenneth J Arrow “Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention”, in R. Nelson (ed.), 
The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activities: Economic and Social Factors (Princeton University Press 
1962); Philippe Aghion et al., ‘Competition and Innovation: An Inverted-U Relationship’ 120 (2005) 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 701; Jonathan B Baker, ‘Beyond Schumpeter vs. Arrow: How Competition 
Fosters Innovation’, 3 (2007) Antitrust Law Journal 575. 
22 Pierre Larouche and Marteen Pieter Schinkel, ‘Continental Drift in the Treatment of Dominant Firms: 
Article 102 TFEU in contrast to Section 2 Sherman Act’, in Daniel Sokol (ed.), Oxford Handbook of 
International Antitrust Economics (Oxford University Press 2014), 153-187. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Pinar Akman, ‘The Role of Freedom in Competition Law’ (2014) 34 (2) Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies, 183. Liza Lovdahl Gormsen, A Principled Approach to Abuse of Dominance in European 
Competition Law (CUP, 2012). 
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other than economic efficiency25, or whether broader public policy objectives should 
enter competition analysis26. While contributions to the debate have been insightful, one 
can observe a tendency to abstract from the economic character of competition law, 
quickly leading to the argument that competition enforcers should also protect other 
values27. In my view, this argument conflates the two different issues of definition of 
economic efficiency in EU competition law, on the one hand, and institutional coherence 
of EU on the other. The latter in particular is ensured by the general policy-linking clause 
of article 7 TFEU28, as well as more specific clauses of articles 8 to 16 TFEU, which 
prevent the Union from disregarding objectives which may have little or even nothing to 
do with competition analysis. It is therefore only as a matter of enforcement that these 
additional policies become relevant, requiring the enforcing institution (a category that 
includes the judiciary) to consider the impact on additional values. Yet, it is submitted 
that this does not allow enforcers to imbue competition analysis with broader public 
policy objectives: their ultimate duty is to apply the rules so that competition in the 
internal market is not distorted29, which is ostensibly an economic objective30.  
A different question, which remains open, is how that economic objective should be 
pursued in individual cases: for example, when do choice considerations outweigh the 
benefits of price cuts? When (that is, with reference to what interference threshold) does 
the goal of the internal market trump a “pure” competition analysis? While the latter 
																																																								
25 See in this regard, the 2014 annual conference held at the Ameican Antitrust Insittute entitled “The 
Inefficiencies of efficiency”, and the related paper and supporting materials, at 
<http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/2014annualconference> accessed 15 September 2016. See also van 
Rumpuy (2012), supra note 19. 
26 See Townley, supra note 19; Giorgio Monti, 'Article 81 EC and Public Policy' 39 (2002) 5 Common 
Market Law Review, 1057. 
27 See e.g. Van Rumpuy, supra note 19; Suzanne Kingston, Greening Competition Policy (Cambridge 
University Press 2012); Federico Ferretti, EU Competition Law, the Consumer Interest and Data 
Protection: The Exchange of Consumer Information in the Financial Sector (Springer, 2014). 
28 “The Union shall ensure consistency between its policies and activities, taking all of its objectives into 
account and in accordance with the principle of conferral of powers». 
29 See Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Protocol (n.27) on the Internal Market and 
Competition. 
30 One may of course contend that laws and regulations contribute to the definition of the type of 
“competition” that is permitted in the internal market (e.g., outlawing conduct which constitute a financial 
or environmental offence), thereby injecting public policy considerations into the analysis. However, the 
effect of those public policy considerations is to constrain the interpretation of the enforcer, rather than 
creating discretionary mechanisms for policy leverage.     
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question has found some specific answers in the case law31, we are still in the dark when 
it comes to the meaning of “undistorted competition” as a trade-off between static and 
dynamic efficiencies.  
Certainly, the preoccupation for the distortion of the competitive process is a central 
component of EU competition law. The key to understanding the notion of “competitive 
process” is not to be fixated on a static notion of economic efficiency, which is typically 
measured via price, quantity or even quality parameters given the prevailing market 
conditions. Taking into account dynamic efficiencies requires the adoption of a more 
complex “consumer choice” or “consumer sovereignty” approach, which has been 
defined as enabling customers to choose the products they consider as best to fit their 
needs32 and to influence the competitive process acting according to their preferences33. 
This means that competition law should not protect only the consumers of a particular 
product: doing so may be in conflict with the interest of the consumers of other actual or 
potential products that would otherwise be brought to the market. As illustrated by 
Nihoul, this line of reasoning can be found in several cases, starting from Hoffman La 
Roche where the Court expressed its concern for: 
 
[…] the objective of undistorted competition within the common market, because- unless there are 
exceptional circumstances which may make an agreement between undertakings in the context of article 85 
and in particular of paragraph (3) of that article permissible,  [these practices] are not based on an economic 
																																																								
31 See for example Case 42/84, Remia and Others v Commission [1985] ECR 2545, para 22; Joined Cases 
C-403/08 and C-429/08, Football Association Premier League Ltd and Others v QC Leisure and Others 
and Karen Murphy v Media Protection Services Limited [2011] ECR I-9083, para 139. Joined Cases C-
468/06 to C-478/06 Sot. Lélos kai Sia and Others [2008] ECR I-7139, paragraph 65. 
32 Paul Nihoul, The Emergence of a Powerful Concept in European Competition Law, available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2077694 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2077694, p. 5. 
33  Ioannis Lianos, ‘The Price/Non Price Exclusionary Abuses Dichotomy: A Critical Appraisal’ , (2009) 2 
Concurrences Review, para 10, citing by way of comparison the different formulation by Neil Averitt and 
Robert Lande, ‘Consumer Sovereignty: A unified theory of Antitrust And Consumer Protection law’, 65 
(1997) Antitrust Law Journal 713 (“the set of societal arrangements that causes that economy to act 
primarily in response to aggregate signals of consumer demand, rather than in response to government 
directives or the preferences of individual businesses”). 
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transaction which justifies this burden or benefit but are designed to deprive the purchaser or restrict his 
possible choices of sources of supply and to deny other producers access to the market34 .  
 
However, this choice-based perspective does not provide an exhaustive answer to the 
question of how much these dynamic considerations ought to be weighed in competition 
analysis. This in itself seems appropriate, given that the weight of innovation may vary 
significantly depending on the industry and the specific conduct at issue35. What is more 
problematic, however, is that such trade-offs are typically made in a “black box”, without 
an effective ability of the concerned undertakings to contest the innovation theory put 
forward against it. This is due in no insignificant part to the limited room for defences 
within articles 101 and 102.  
Given EU competition law’s preoccupation with the competitive process in preserving 
consumers’ ability to choose potentially new products or services, one would expect 
innovation considerations to be integral part of competition analysis. From a structural 
perspective, however, this is not the case: for both article 101 and article 102 TFEU, 
innovation arguments are relegated to the tail end of the enquiry. Recognizing this 
structural bias in competition analysis is important given the advantage that the European 
Commission (or the relevant competition authority) has in framing the case, imposing on 
the defendant the burden of rebutting the allegations. Due the burden imposed on 
defending undertakings and the limited review conducted by the EU’s judicature36, legal 
battles are often lost over the admissibility and success of defences to alleged 
infringements of EU competition law.   
2.2. The place for innovation considerations in article 101 
Article 101 (1) prohibits agreements or concerted practices that have as their object or 
																																																								
34 ECJ judgment of 13 February 1979, Case 85/76 Hoffmann-La Roche &. Co. AG v Commission [1979] 
ECR 46, at 90. 
35 See Mark Lemley, ‘Antitrust-Specific Policy for Innovation’, (2011) 2011 Columbia Business Law 
Review 637. 
36 For a holistic assessment, see Nicolas Petit and Damien Geradin, “Judicial Review in European Union 
Competition Law: A Quantitative and Qualitative Assessment” in Massimo Merola and Jaques Derenne 
(eds.) The Role of the Court of Justice of the EU in Competition Law Cases (Bruylant 2012); Heike 
Schweitzer, ‘Judicial Review in EU Competition Law’, in Damien Geradin & Ioannis Lianos (eds.), 
Research Handbook on EU Antitrust Law (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2014). 
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effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition. This means that there are 
two types of restrictions: one where sufficient proof of likely anticompetitive effects must 
be produced (restriction by effect); and the second one where such effects are presumed 
(restriction by object). The latter category is reserved to restrictions that reveal to be 
“sufficiently deleterious” to competition in light of the legal and economic context37. The 
Opinion of Advocate General Wahl in Cartes Bancaires38 suggests that such revelation 
occurs on the basis of two alternative factors, i.e. economic science and the experience 
gathered by the court. Furthermore, the Commission observes that (non-exhaustive) 
guidance in this respect can be found in its block exemption regulations, guidelines and 
notices – in particular, suggesting that “blacklisted” or “hardcore” restrictions in those 
document would generally be considered “by object”.  
In the former category, a balancing takes place to determine whether the loss in intra-
brand competition as a result of the agreement is necessary to improve inter-brand 
competition, or viceversa39. If this is the case, then the agreement falls outside article 101 
(1) because it does not produce likely anticompetitive effects. However, when an 
agreement between undertakings falls within the prohibition of article 101 (1), it can still 
be exempted under article 101 (3) under the following well-known conditions:  
a)! The agreement must contribute to improving the production or distribution of 
goods or contribute to promoting technical or economic progress; 
b)! The agreement should allow consumers a fair share of the resulting benefits;  
c)! The restrictions must be indispensable to the attainment of these objectives; and  
d)! The agreement must not afford the parties the possibility of eliminating 
competition in respect of a substantial part of the products in question. 
The articulation of each of these conditions has been addressed in detail by the 
																																																								
37 See Case C!67/13 P, Groupement des cartes bancaires (CB) v European Commission, EU:C:2014:2204, 
paras 359 and 360; Case C-209/07, Competition Authority v Beef Industry Development Society Ltd and 
Barry Brothers (Carrigmore) Meats Ltd (BIDS) [2008] ECR I-08637par 15; Allianz Hungária Biztosító and 
Others, C!32/11, EU:C:2013:160, para 34 and the case-law cited. 
38  Case C-67/13 P, Groupement des cartes bancaires (CB) v European Commission. 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:2204. 
39 See Joined Cases 56/64 and 58/66, Consten and Grundig, [1966] ECR 429. See also Commission 
Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty (2004/C 101/08), para. 17. 
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Commission Guidelines, its case-law as well as specific scholarly contributions on the 
subject40. For purposes of this discussion, it suffices to highlight an important difference 
between the balancing conducted under article 101 (1) and the similar exercise 
undertaken pursuant to article 101 (3). As clearly stated by the Commission41 and the 
Courts42, it is exclusively within article 101 (3) that an assessment is made of the pro-
competitive benefits produced by that agreement, and of whether they outweigh the anti-
competitive effects. Thus, the exercise conducted under article 101 (1) is one of different 
nature.  
The Guidelines provide some more specific insight on what that exercise entails: first, it 
requires a comparison of the state of competition in the absence of the agreement with the 
one resulting from the existence of the same: the so called “counterfactual”43.  Second, 
for the purposes of analysing the restrictive effects of an agreement, the Commission 
explains that it is normally necessary to define the relevant market44, and to assess inter 
alia “the nature of the products, the market position of the parties, the market position of 
competitors, the market position of buyers, the existence of potential competitors and the 
level of entry barriers”.  
One may not call this analysis “balancing” in a technical sense45, but it is in practice a 
multi-factor test with the same logic, where each element can weigh in favor or against a 
finding of anticompetitiveness. Though according to the Commission this exercise does 
																																																								
40 See e.g. Ben van Rumpuy, supra note 19; Saskia King (2015) Agreements that restrict competition by 
object under Article 101(1) TFEU: past, present and future. PhD thesis, The London School of Economics 
and Political Science. Available at <http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/3068/> accessed 10 September 2016. 
41 See Guidelines, para 11. 
42 See Case T-522/03, Van den Bergh Foods, [2003] II-04653 para 107; Case T-112/99, Métropole 
télévision (M6) and others, [2001] ECR II-2459, para 74. 
43 See for instance Damien Geradin and Ianis Girgenson, ‘ The Counterfactual Method in EU Competition 
Law: The Cornerstone of the Effects-Based Approach’ in Jacques Bourgeois and Denis Waelbroeck 
 (eds.) Ten years of effects-based approach in EU competition law (Bruylant, 2013). 
44 However, the Guidelines also to skip market definition and show anti-competitive effects directly, by 
analysing the conduct of the parties to the agreement on the mark. See Guidelines, para 27. However, it t is 
clear that such assessment can be done only for very serious violations, and always by adopting a tentative 
and hypothetical market definition to initiate the assessment. 
45 From a narrow definitional standpoint, balancing means “considering the competing interests of the 
litigants (or of society more generally) and giving judgment for the side with the weightier interests”. See 
Patrick M. McFadden, The Balancing Test, (1988) 29 Boston College Law Review 585. 
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not evaluate the benefits to competition stemming from the agreement, this type of 
evaluation is in fact often implicit in weighing different dimensions of competition, such 
as interbrand v. intrabrand. However, this test explicitly weeds out the assessment of 
improvements in quality, productivity, and dynamic efficiencies more generally, even 
though those may well have significant implications on interbrand and intrabrand 
competition.  
On the other hand, the test incorporates an additional component which recognizes the 
necessity of certain restrictions of competition as a means to obtain legitimate objectives. 
This so called “ancillarity” concept has been implicitly part of EU competition law since 
Societe’ Technique Miniere v Mascinenabau Ulm, where the Court held that an exclusive 
license to a distributor does not infringe article 101 (1) to the extent that it is “really 
necessary for the penetration of a new area by an undertaking” 46. The issue of necessity 
was also central in evaluating the ancillarity of exclusive licensing to intellectual property 
in Nungesser KG v Commission47 and Coditel v Cine Vog Films Sa (No. 2)48, both 
revolving around the appropriate amount of exclusivity that would attract sufficient 
investment. Thus, an observation of these early cases suggested that, by allowing the 
imposition of restrictions commensurate to securing the appropriate incentive for 
investment, the Court effectively incorporated dynamic considerations through the 
backdoor of article 101 (1). 
However, subsequent case law significantly narrowed the room for this dynamic 
interpretation: distilling the concept of ancillarity from the guidelines for the assessment 
of joint ventures (and in particular, the notices on ancillary restrictions49 and on joint 
ventures50), the General Court ruled in Metropole that “ancillary restraints” refer to those 
that are “objectively necessary” to implement an operation51. Specifically, the evaluation 
																																																								
46 Case 56/65 Société Technique Minière v Maschinenbau Ulm [1966] ECR 235, para 250. 
47 Case 258/78, Nungesser KG and Kurt Eisele v Commission [1982] ECR 2015. 
48 Case 262/81, Coditel SA v Cine Vog Films SA (No 2) [1982] [2001] ECR II-02459. 
49 Commission Notice on restrictions directly related and necessary to concentrations, OJ C 56, 05.03.2005, 
pp. 24-31. 
50 Commission Notice on the concept of full-function joint ventures under Council Regulation (EEC) No 
4064/89 on the control of concentrations between undertakings,  OJ C 66, 2.3.1998, pp. 1–4. 
51 Case T- 112/99  Métropole télévision (M6), Suez-Lyonnaise des eaux, France Télécom and Télévision 
française 1 SA (TF1) v Commission of the European Communities [2001] ECR II-02459, para 109. 
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of “necessity” cannot imply an assessment, in the light of the competitive situation on the 
relevant market, of whether the restriction is indispensable to the commercial success of 
the main operation52, or the establishment of the undertaking on the market on a long-
term basis53. In other words, it appears that indispensability cannot be used to justify 
restrictions that secure profits going beyond short-term commercial viability. This rigid 
approach to the interpretation of necessity was confirmed by the recent judgment in 
Mastercard v Commission, where the Court held that the mere fact that the operation is 
more difficult to implement without the restriction, or even less profitable, cannot justify 
a claim ‘objective necessity’54. Clearly, this stringent notion of “indispensability” does 
not bode well with the uncertainty that is intrinsic to innovation processes, or with their 
non-linear ability to generate additional consumer demand. As a result, using this limited 
escape permitted under article 101 (1) seems inappropriate in the absence of an ability to 
provide the decision-maker with a detailed plan of quantification, a timeline for 
materialization of the expected gains, and an explanation of why the restriction(s) would 
be indispensable to that end.  
There is also another possible line of defence with regard to ancillarity. Whereas the 
majority of cases referred to a notion of ancillarity based on necessity for a commercial 
transaction, a few of them revolved around necessity for the fulfillment of a regulatory 
function entrusted to a particular private entity. The Court considered that account must 
be taken of the objectives pursued by the decision of the association, which it found to be 
connected “with the need to make rules relating to organization, qualifications, 
professional ethics, supervision and liability, in order to ensure that the ultimate 
consumer of legal services and the sound administration of justice are provided with the 
necessary guarantees in relation to integrity and experience”.  Subsequent cases have held 
this “regulatory ancillarity” doctrine applicable to other public authorities, such the 
Portuguese Order of Chartered Accountants (Oficiais de Conta)55, the Association of 
																																																								
52 Para 115. 
53 Para 120. 
54 Case C-382/12, MasterCard Inc. and Others v European Commission (not yet published), para. 91. Note 
that this seems to overrule the standard proposed by the Commission in its Guidelines, which refers to 
difficulty in implementation of the non-restrictive transaction as a valid basis for ancillarity claims. See 101 
(3) Guidelines, para. 31 (emphasis added). 
55 Case C-1/12 Ordem dos Técnicos Oficiais de Contas v Autoridade da Concorrência [2013] 4 CMLR 20. 
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Italian Geologists (Italian Geologists)56 and the Italian Observatory for road traffic safety 
and social security (Consulta generale per l’autotrasporto e la logistica)57. The notion of 
public authority has been extended to international regulatory bodies recognized by 
international law, such as the International Olympic Committee (Meca Medina)58 . 
However, it is more controversial whether such doctrine can be invoked by private 
organizations which have not been officially entrusted with authority by the State59. 
There is no case law supporting this interpretation, and the ECJ ruling in Slovak Banks 
seems to suggest otherwise, clarifying that it is not for private undertaking to take steps to 
ensure compliance with legal requirements.60 This would seem to apply a fortiori where 
undertakings appeal to the pursuit of self-proclaimed public interests in order to take 
actions which amount to an infringment of competition law. 
 
It is therefore through article 101 (3) that innovation can more realistically be pleaded as 
defence to what would constitute otherwise an agreement in violation of article 101. 
Although the test of article 101 (3) appears on its face as demanding as article 101 (1) 
when it comes to indispensability, the Commission has suggested a more flexible 
interpretation, by referring to any restriction being “reasonably necessary” for the 
efficiency in question61. Importantly, the focus of this analysis is not whether in the 
absence of the restriction the agreement would not have been concluded (as in the case of 
ancillarity), but rather whether more efficiencies are produced with the agreement or 
restriction than in the absence of the agreement or restriction62 . Furthermore, the 
Guidelines specify that the Commission will not use (potentially demanding) hypothetical 
																																																								
56 Case C-136/12, Consiglio nazionale dei geologi v Autorità garante della concorrenza e del mercato and 
Autorità garante della concorrenza e del mercato v Consiglio nazionale dei geologi [2013] 5 CMLR 40. 
57 Joined Cases C‑184/13 to C‑187/13, C‑194/13, C‑195/13 and C‑208/13, API - Anonima Petroli Italiana 
SpA, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2147. 
58 Case C 519/04 P, David Meca-Medina and Igor Majcen v Commission of the European Communities 
[2006] ECR I-06991. 
59 In this sense, see Richard Wish and David Bailey, Competition Law (5th ed., Oxford University Press 
2015) 141. Cf. Katarina Pijetlovic, EU Sports Law and Breakaway Leagues in Football (Springer 2015) 
153–54. 
60 Case C-68/12, Protimonopolný úrad Slovenskej republiky v Slovenská sporiteľňa a.s., EU:C:2013:71, 
para. 20. 
61 Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty, OJ C 101, 27.4.2004, p. 97–118, para 73. 
62 Id., para 74. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3158008 
																														
	 16	
or theoretical alternatives as benchmark for the counterfactual. Counterfactuals offered 
by the undertakings will be readily accepted, unless it is reasonably clear that there are 
realistic and attainable alternatives63”. 
The test under article 101 (3) presents at least four significant obstacles for the 
incorporation of data protection and data-driven innovation. First, it is too deterministic 
for the kind of innovation that is generated today by the accumulation and use of data. In 
particular, the test requires under its first prong to “describe and explain in detail what is 
the nature of the efficiencies and how and why they constitute an objective economic 
benefit”64. The explanation must include, in case the agreement has yet to be fully 
implemented, any projections as to the date from which the efficiencies will become 
operational so as to have a significant positive impact in the market65. In the case of data-
driven innovation, this seems a little bit like fitting a square peg into a round hole:  since 
it is claimed that big data is reversing the direction of discovery, using data to foster 
hypotheses rather than “prove” existing hypotheses66, the idea of predetermining the 
outcome of the innovation process seems irreconcilable with the very concept of big data 
– at least as long as a competition authority will not relax the requirements of specificity 
and quantifiability67.  In the case of data protection innovation, the main problem is again 
one of quantifiability and commensurability: without a specific value attributed to 
enhanced data protection, how can it be balanced against a restriction of competition? 
A second hurdle consists in the narrow focus on economic efficiency for the purposes of 
the first prong of this test. The Guidelines limit the pursuit of goals of other Treaty 
provisions to the extent that they cannot be subsumed under the four conditions of Article 
101(3)68. In fact, the practice of the Commission is to frame broader welfare benefits such 
																																																								
63 Id., para 75 (emphasis added).  
64 Para 57. 
65 Para 58. 
66 Victor Mayer-Schoenberger and Yann Padova, ‘Regime Change? Enabling Big Data through Europe's 
New Data Protection Regulation’  (2016)17 Columbia Science and Technology Law Review 315,  319. 
67 For a recommendation in this sense, see Miguel De la Mano De la Mano, ‘For the customer‘s sake: The 
competitive effects of efficiencies on the European merger control’, 11 (2009) European Commission‘s 
Enterprise Directorate-General Enterprise Papers, para 52. 
68 Para 42. 
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as environmental protection69, sustainable development70 and employment71 as part of the 
efficiency test. However, this canonic interpretation of economic efficiency as the 
maximization of welfare can only capture improvement in privacy protection generated 
for consumers insofar as a market for the product with additional privacy can be readily 
identified72. Although one could make speculations about the desire of consumers to 
receive such protections, in the absence of specific surveys or other measurement 
techniques, they are likely to be dismissed as unsubstantiated.73   
A third obstacle lies in the heterogeneous preferences of consumers, in relation to the 
requirement to pass on a fair share of the benefits to consumers. While the Commission 
has taken (in line with the case law) a broad interpretation which includes final and 
intermediate consumers74, less flexibility is provided with regard to the identification of 
the group of consumers to which the benefits must accrue. In particular, the Commission 
requires the efficiencies generated by the restrictive agreement within a relevant market 
to be sufficient to outweigh the anti-competitive effects produced by the agreement 
within that same relevant market. Only in the case of substantial consumer commonality 
with the market affected by the restriction, can the efficiencies achieved in a separate 
market be taken into account75. It should be noted that the EU case law does not offer 
consistent support for this requirement76, and most recently in Mastercard expanded the 
																																																								
69 Exxon/Shell (Case IV.33.640) Commission Decision 94/322/EC (1994)OJ L 144/20. 
70 CECED (Case IV.F.I/36.718) Commission Decision 2000/475/EC (2000) OJ L 187/47. 
71 Syntehtic Fibers (Case IV/30.810) Commission Decision 84/380/EEC (1984) OJ L 207/17, paras 37-38; 
Stichting Baksteen (Case IV/34.456) Commission Decision 94/296/EC (1994) OJ L 131/15, paras 27-28; 
Ford/ Volkswagen (Case IV/33.814) Commission Decision 93/49/EC [1993] OJ L 20/14.  
72 A fitting example to give an idea of this type of complexity is the “Chickens for Tomorrow” case decided 
in 2015 by the Dutch competition authority. The authority released a full paper explaining the economic 
analysis it conducted to attribute a market value to increased animal welfare. See Authority for Consumers 
and Markets, ‘ACM’s analysis of the sustainability arrangements concerning the ‘Chicken of Tomorrow’’ 
(26 January 2015), available at https://www.acm.nl/en/publications/publication/13789/ACMs-analysis-of-
the-sustainability-arrangements-concerning-the-Chicken-of-Tomorrow.  
73 For the same reason, Townley advocates for the incorporation into the assessment of wider social and 
environmental costs and benefits, for which there is no market price. See Townley, supra note 19. 
74 Para 84. 
75 See Guidelines, para 43, referring to Case T-131/99, Shaw [2002] ECR II-2023, paragraph 163; Case C-
360/92 P, The Publishers Association v Commission  [1995] ECR I-23, paragraph 29. See also 
Continental/United/Lufthansa/Air Canada (Case COMP/39.595) Commission Decision of 23 May 2013. 
76 See Compagnie Générale Maritime and Others, T-86/95 [2002] ECR II-1011, paras 343-345; Case T-
168/1 GlaxoSmithKline Services Unlimited v Commission [2006] ECR II-2969, para 248. 
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scope for cross-market efficiency analysis by accepting efficiencies in a connected 
market even in the absence of consumer commonality, as long as those benefits produce 
“objective advantages” for the consumers in the market concerned77. However, while the 
feedback effects generating the objective advantages in that judgment were grounded on 
the clear interdependency between two-sided payment markets, it seems harder to claim 
such objective advantage where the product in one market is simply used as “bait” for 
acquiring customer data to be used in a variety of different markets, often unbeknownst 
to consumers and for different purposes than those upon which they agreed to the 
disclosure. On a more positive note, the “objective advantage” formulation opens the 
possibility to consider broader benefits than the efficiencies described in the Guidelines, 
though it remains to be seen whether the advantage must materialize on the other side of 
a two-sided market. What this implies in terms of data-driven innovation, in particular 
when it comes to personal data, is that the test will not be satisfied in the absence of a 
feedback loop going back to the market in which the customer data were collected.  The 
benefit does not need to accrue to each and every consumer of that group78, but one may 
wonder whether there would be a sufficient number of consumers that for instance 
consider behaviorally targeted advertising an “objective advantage”. 
Finally, the fourth obstacle to the incorporation of innovation considerations within 
article 101 (3) is the fulfillment of its fourth condition (no elimination of competition). 
While this condition provides a safeguard against efficiencies that undermine the 
competitive process, the challenge lies in fitting into this notion of competition a dynamic 
perspective – competition for the market as opposed to competition in the market. This 
seems to be disfavored by the Commission’s reliance on the presumption that when 
competition is eliminated, the agreement’s long-term welfare losses will outweigh short-
term efficiency gains79. The challenge presented by this condition for the incorporation of 
dynamic considerations is also apparent in  the case for restrictive agreements that could 
potentially be justified on data-driven innovation grounds: for example, a shared data 
repository among competitors to keep track of trends and predict future prices on the 
																																																								
77 MasterCard and Others v Commission, C-382/12P, EU:C:2014:2201, para 241. 
78 See Guidelines, para 86 ; and Asnef-Equifax v Ausbanc C-238/05 [2006] ECR I-11125, para 70. 
79 Para 105. 
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basis of recent historical data might increase industry know-how, but also constitute a red 
flag for its facilitation of collusion. A different reasoning would apply to apparently 
anticompetitive conduct which produces important data protection innovation, such as for 
example a boycott amongst browser vendors against websites that track users across the 
web. In that context, it can be argued that the condition of “no elimination of 
competition” militates against granting an article 101 (3) exemption for an action that 
proactively shapes a particular consumer demand for privacy (as it eliminates price 
competition that would otherwise exist), but legitimates one aimed at satisfying an 
existing demand for it (as the reduction in price competition is outweighed by the 
increase in another existing dimension of competition).  
2. 3. The place for innovation considerations within article 102 
Article 102 TFEU prohibits undertaking from abusing their dominant position in the 
market, making reference to an indicative list of abusive practices. However, that list is 
incomplete on the conditions under which such practices materialize. It has therefore 
been the task of the Commission and the Courts to give content to such categories. This 
has led to the identification of a number of categories of conduct falling within the 
definition of so called “prima facie” abuse. This characterization, in recognition of the 
inherent difficulty in the area of unilateral conduct to distinguish between aggressive 
competition from conduct which harms consumers, rules out the existence of so called 
“per se” or “object” abuses under article 10280. The conclusive establishment of abuse 
can indeed be avoided by a defendant, either showing efficiency benefits that outweigh 
any anticompetitive effects, or alleging an objective justification for that conduct. 
This bi-partite structure of article 102, where efficiencies are not assessed as integral part 
of the initial assessment but on a separate and additional step, is not immune from 
criticism. It is typically justified on the premise that a dominant undertaking has the 
special responsibility not to distort competition, which is already endangered by the 
presence of the undertaking in question81. This section does not aim to make sense of the 
																																																								
80 See in this sense, the Opinion of AG Colomer in Joined Cases C-468/06 to C-478/06 Sot. Lélos kai Sia v 
GlaxoSmithKline [2008] ECR I- 7139, para 75. 
81 See Hoffman la Roche, para 91. 
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test devised for prima facie abuses, which has been discussed at length in the literature82. 
In contrast, it provides highlights of the difficulties faced by defendant in raising 
innovation considerations as justifications. 
The first, most obvious ground for defence is the efficiency justification. While the case-
law has not always been consistent on the admissibility of such justifications83, it is now 
well settled that in an abuse of dominance inquiry, “it has to be determined whether the 
exclusionary effect [...] may be counterbalanced, or outweighed, by advantages in terms 
of efficiency which also benefit the consumer”84. 
Furthermore, since its 2009 Guidance Paper, the Commission offered a framework for 
evaluating efficiencies within article 102 which bears striking resemblance with 101 (3). 
Its 4 conditions are:  
(a) the efficiencies have been, or are likely to be, realised as a result of the conduct;  
(b) the conduct is indispensable to the realisation of those efficiencies ; 
© the likely efficiencies brought about by the conduct outweigh any likely negative 
effects on competition and consumer welfare in the affected markets;  and 
(d) the conduct does not eliminate effective competition, by removing all or most existing 
sources of actual or potential competition85 
This framework, subsequently endorsed by the Court of Justice in Post Danmark and 
																																																								
82 See, among the many excellent contributions, Pinar Akman, The Concept of Abuse (Hart Publishing, 
2012); Ekatrina Rousseva, Rethinking Exclusionary Abuses in EU Competition Law: Rethinking Article 82 
of the EC Treaty (Hart Publishing, 2010); Renato Nazzini, The Foundations of European Union 
Competition Law: The Objective and Principles of Article 102 (Oxford University Press 2011); Liza 
Lovdahl-Gormsen, A Principle Approach to Abuse of Dominance (Cambridge University Press 2012).  
83 Compare: Case 322/81, Michelin I [ 1983] ECR I-3461, para 85; C-202/07, France Télécom [2009] ECR 
I-2369, para 217, Atlantic Container [ 1983] ECR I-3461 [2003] ECR II-03275 para 1112; With T-203/01, 
Michelin II [2003] ECR II-4071,para 98; C-95/04 P, British Airway [2007] ECR I-2331paras 69 and 86; T-
201/04, Microsoft, 2007 II-3601para 1135; C-52/09, TeliaSonera, [2011] ECR I-527,  para 76. 
84 Case C-95/04 P, British Airways plc v. Commission [2007], ECR I-2331. 
85 Guidance Paper, para 30. 
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Telia Sonera86, was hailed as a welcome step towards the legalization of a more 
economic approach to article 10287. But not without some criticism for the high bar 
imposed on defendants for efficiency claims88: due to it being essentially a replication of 
article 101 (3), it carries with it many of the problems illustrated in section 2.2. Instead of 
repeating the same analysis conducted there, it is sufficient to make two observations: 
first, the conditions for efficiency under 102 do not contain a requirement of “fair share” 
of benefits to consumers. While this appears to be a relaxation of the bar imposed in 
article 101 (3), the Guidance paper in fact suggests that this is inextricably linked to, and 
arguably subsumed within, the fourth condition: “In [the] absence [of rivalry between 
undertakings] the dominant undertaking will lack adequate incentives to continue to 
create and pass on efficiency gains”89. Second, the requirement of no elimination of 
effective competition appears to be significantly more restrictive in the case of a 
dominant company. The Paper’s assertions that “Where there is no residual competition 
and no foreseeable threat of entry, the protection of rivalry and the competitive process 
outweighs possible efficiency gains90” reveal a fundamental distrust for innovations 
carried out by dominant firms who can act unconstrained from competition in the 
relevant market. This is only partly mitigated by the following statement that 
“[E]xclusionary conduct which maintains, creates or strengthens a market position 
approaching that of a monopoly can normally not be justified on the grounds that it also 
creates efficiency gains”91. All in all, the wording suggests that the conduct of a dominant 
firm (at least when it approaches a monopoly) will be scrutinized under article 102 for 
any potential exclusionary effects it may cause - even where it is proven to generate 
immediate and substantial efficiencies.  
																																																								
86 Case C-209/10, Post Danmark v. Konkurrencerådet, para. 42.; Case C-52/09, TeliaSonera, [2011] ECR 
I-527, para 76. 
87 Christian Alborn and Jorge Padilla, 'From Fairness To Welfare: Implications for the Assessment of 
Unilateral Conduct under EC Competition Law”, in Mel Marquis and Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, European 
Competition Law Annual 2007: A Reformed Approach to Article 82 EC (Oxford University Press 2008). 
88See e.g. John Temple Lang, ‘Judicial review of competition decisions under the European Convention on 
Human Rights and the importance of the EFTA court: the Norway Post judgment’, (2012) 38 European 
Law Review 464, at 487; Hans W Friederiszick and Linda Gratz, ‘Dominant and Efficient – On the 
Relevance of Efficiencies in Abuse of Dominance Cases’, in: OECD Policy Roundtables, The Role of 
Efficiency Claims in Antitrust Proceedings 2012 (DAF/COMP(2012)23), at 38. 
89 Para 30. 
90 Para 31. 
91 Ibid. (emphasis added). 
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In addition to efficiency, a firm can raise a defence based on an objective justification. 
This defence relates to public policy concerns or other objective factors, i.e. that are 
beyond the control of the undertaking, which force it to take a particular course of 
conduct92. For example, a refusal to deal could be justified by a legitimate concern that 
sharing a facility would undermine its quality, security, or safety93. Likewise, a restriction 
of parallel trade can be justified on the basis of differences in national regulation, to the 
extent that  (a) State intervention is one of the factors liable to create the opportunities for 
parallel trade in the first place and (b) a different interpretation of Article 102, rejecting 
any possibility of justification, would have left dominant firms only the choice ‘not to 
place its medicines on the market at all in a Member State where the prices of those 
products are set at a relatively low level94’. Along the same lines, one can infer from the 
Commission’s decision in Port of Genoa95 and Spanish Airports96 that the protection of 
the environment may constitute an objective justification to a prima facie abuse97.   
Potentially, this justification is highly valuable for a dominant undertaking in the data-
driven economy, as it opens the door for the incorporation of data protection innovation 
so long as the restrictions of competition are not disproportionate (for example, installing 
automatic browser ad blocking which by default blocks all domains from a competitor). 
However, it is important to bear in mind that not all actions can be taken by an 
undertaking in the name of objective necessity: the Commission warns in its Guidance 
paper that proof of whether conduct of this kind is objectively necessary must take into 
account the competences defined by the applicable regulatory framework, including by 
recognizing that it is normally the task of public authorities to set and enforce public 
																																																								
92 Ekatrina Rousseva, ‘The Concept of Objective Justification’ 2 (2006) 2 Competition Law Review, 27, 
28-29. 
93 FAG-Flughafen Frankfurt/Main AG, OJ 1998 L 72/30. 
94 Joined Cases C-468/06 to 478/06, Sot Lelos kai Sia v GlaxoSmithKline, para 67-68. 
95 97/745/EC: Commission Decision of 21 October 1997 relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 90 (3) 
of the EC Treaty regarding the tariffs for piloting in the Port of Genoa ; OJ L 301, 5.11.1997, p. 27–35. 
96 1999/199/EC: Commission Decision of 10 February 1999 relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 90 
of the Treaty (Case No IV/35.703 - Portuguese airports) (notified under document number C(1999) 243); 
OJ L 69, 16.3.1999, p. 31–39. 
97 T. Vijver , Objective justification and Prima Facie anti-competitive unilateral conduct : an exploration 
of EU Law and beyond. University of Leiden Dissertation (2014). Available at 
https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/handle/1887/29593. 
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health and safety standards98. As the Court explained in Hilti, “it is not the task of a 
dominant undertaking to take steps on its own initiative to exclude products which it 
regards, rightly or wrongly, as dangerous or inferior to its own product”.99 This line of 
cases seems to suggest that, somewhat in parallel with article 101 (1), the use of public 
policy as a justification is confined within the competences that are attributed to 
undertakings under the existing regulatory framework. Unlike with article 101 (1), 
however, this defence seems to leave room for undertakings who have not been officially 
entrusted with a public function to take initiative for the protection of public policy, to the 
extent that this is recognized as a valid public policy and does not clash with the 
regulatory system in place. Once again, the concept of objective justification implies that 
the measures taken must be proportionate, meaning that they will not be considered valid 
if there are less restrictive alternatives. From a data protection innovation standpoint, it 
will be interesting to see whether a broader concept of restrictiveness could be used, 
which is not limited to the effects on competition, but considers the impact of a measure 
on conflicting rights and interests protected by the Treaty (such as freedom of expression, 
for instance). Perhaps one way to reconcile the test with the importance of human rights 
in the EU is by reading the requirement of respect for fundamental rights into the notion 
of competition that the Treaty protects (as would be required by article 51 of the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights)100.  
A particular example of objective justification is the conduct of “competition on the 
merits”. By this term, courts generally refer to a conduct whereby an undertaking takes 
reasonable and proportionate steps to protect its own commercial interests, even if such 
protective measures might have some exclusionary effect101. It is thus apparent that this 
																																																								
98 Para 29. 
99 Case T-30/89 Hilti v Commission [1991] ECR II-1439, paragraph 118-119; See also Case T-83/91 Tetra 
Pak International v Commission (Tetra Pak II) [1994] ECR II-755, paragraphs 83 and 84 and 138. 
100 According to article 51, “The provisions of this Charter are addressed to the institutions and bodies of 
the Union with due regard for the principle of subsidiarity and to the Member States only when they are 
implementing Union law. They shall therefore respect the rights, observe the principles and promote the 
application thereof in accordance with their respective powers.” (emphasis added). 
101 See for example United Brands, para 189. See also e.g. Joined cases C-468/06 to C-478/06 Sot. Lélos 
kai Sia v. GlaxoSmithKline [2008] ECR I-7139, para 69; Case T-65/89 BPB Industries and British Gypsum 
v Commission [1993] ECR II-389 para 9; Deutsche Telekom [2010] ECR I-9555 para 177; AstraZeneca, 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3158008 
																														
	 24	
concept provides more leeway than the above mentioned efficiency defence. The ruling 
of the Court in Post Danmark I offered a more telling characterization of the concept: 
“[N]ot every exclusionary effect is necessarily detrimental to competition […] Competition on the merits 
may, by definition, lead to the departure from the market or the marginalisation of competitors that are less 
efficient and so less attractive to consumers from the point of view of, among other things, price, choice, 
quality or innovation.”102 
It follows that any conduct appealing to customers on the basis of price, choice, quality 
and innovation constitutes competition on the merits, as long as the pursuit of those 
dimensions of competition is accomplished through reasonable and proportionate 
measures by the dominant firm. Arguably, the special responsibility attributed to such 
firms by EU competition law justifies a finding of infringement where the exclusionary 
effect of a measure outweighs its pro-competitive impact on any of those dimensions. 
This explains the “proportionate” part of the defence; however, it still leaves us with the 
open question of what constitute “reasonable” steps, which seems to imply a balancing 
test. While it is impossible in the absence of clarifying decisions to forecast all possible 
flavors of “unreasonableness”, one discerning line to narrow down the ranges of conduct 
that are admissible to protect one’s own commercial interest could be found in the 
violation of other laws. It is true, in that respect, that the Court ruled in Astra Zeneca that 
“the illegality of abusive conduct under Article 102 TFEU is unrelated to its compliance 
or non-compliance with other legal rules and, in the majority of cases, abuses of a 
dominant position consist of behaviour which is otherwise lawful under branches of law 
other than competition law”103. However, Astra Zeneca concerned the different scenario 
where an undertaking had not infringed the law applicable in addition to competition law 
–but rather used that law strategically. As a result, it is arguable that the “unrelated” 
characterization in that ruling should not be interpreted per se as a bar to considering 
non-compliance with “extra-competition” rules as a factor in determining whether a 
particular conduct constitutes competition on the merits. 
																																																																																																																																																																					
para 130; Konkurrensverket v TeliaSonera Sverige AB, [2011] ECR I-527, para 24; Sot. Lélos, supra note 
94, para 69. See also Case T-219/99 British Airways v Commission [2003] ECR II- 5917, para 243. 
102 Post Danmark, para. 19. 
103 C 457/10, AstraZeneca AB and AstraZeneca plc v European Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2012:770, para 
132 (emphasis added). 
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In that judgment, the Court highlighted the difference between the objective of Article 
102 and the primary purpose of the EU legislation invoked by the defendant (Directive 
65/65)104 . This difference of objectives prevented compliance with pharmaceutical 
regulation from being used as a “safe harbor” for purposes of enforcement of competition 
law, which would otherwise be required from a ne bis in idem perspective. This aligned 
with previous cases where the Court rejected the idea of non-intervention by competition 
law into the self-contained regime for telecom regulation, by holding that even the 
encouragement of a given practice by the regulator could not absolve the dominant 
company from its special responsibility under Article 102105. However, the Court also 
explicitly recognized in Telia Sonera the inapplicability of Article 102 TFEU to conduct 
that is explicitly required by national legislation, or where the legal framework eliminates 
any possibility of competitive activity106. This means that competition law will apply 
irrespective of the obligations imposed by national legislation, so long as those 
obligations do not force undertakings from engaging in conduct which prevents, restricts 
or distorts competition107.  
 
If competition law is not required (except for those isolated circumstances) to take into 
account the regulatory frameworks in assessing the conduct of an undertaking, nothing 
seems to prevent competition authorities from doing so to give content to the concept of 
“competition on the merits”, a concept to which neither the Commission’s Guidelines nor 
the case law have given substantive meaning (despite the recommendations made by the 
OECD in this sense)108. This is a powerful instrument to encourage innovation alongside 
the boundaries of legitimacy offered by concurrently applicable regulatory frameworks. 
However, it does not provide a silver bullet for all possible interactions between 
																																																								
104 Council Directive 65/65/EEC of 26 January 1965 on the approximation of provisions laid down by Law, 
Regulation or Administrative Action relating to proprietary medicinal products. OJ 022 , 09/02/1965 pp. 
369 -373. 
105 Deutsche Telekom, para. 84. See also case 123/83 Clair [1985] ECR 391, para. 23 (finding that the mere 
fact that an agreement has been sanctioned by the public authority, thereby making it binding, cannot 
remove it from article 101 (1)). 
106 Telia Sonera, para 49 (emphasis added). 
107  Para 50. 
108 Wolf Souter, Coherence in Competition Law (Oxford University Press 2015) p. 110-111; referring to 
OECD Roundtables on Competition Policy Working Paper No. 56 (OECD Publications, 2005) . 
 <https://www.oecd.org/competition/abuse/35911017.pdf> accessed 15 September 2016. 
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competition and data protection laws (a point developed more in depth in Section 4 
below) and may well result in adverse effects on data protection or even on competition, 
if not used properly. As it will become clear in the following section, there are significant 
specificities in the concept of innovation recognized under data protection law, 
suggesting that the analysis undertaken in that context may not always be transposable in 
the competition field, and viceversa. 
 
 
3.! The place for innovation in data protection law 
 
3.1. A helicopter view of EU data protection law: spotting innovation honey 
pots  
Data protection law is an expanding body of EU law. The legal instrument upon which it 
has been based for over 20 years is the Data Protection Directive (DPD)109, which 
stipulates a dual objective: first, protecting the fundamental rights of individuals, and in 
particular the right to privacy with respect to the protection of personal data; second, the 
free flow of personal data in the internal market110. The Directive sets the standards for 
data protection by EU Member States, thereby preventing such grounds from being raised 
as a barrier to data flows.111  On 25 May 2018, the Directive will be replaced with 
Regulation EU/2016/679, also known as the General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR), which strengthens the level of protection and introduces important changes to 
the existing regulatory regime112 . It should also be noted that, much like in EU 
competition law, a number of guiding documents have been issued to assist in the 
interpretation of key concepts. These guidelines are offered in the form of “advisory 
																																																								
109 Directive 95/46 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data; OJ L 
281, 23/11/1995, p. 31-50. 
110 Orla Lynskey, The Foundations of EU Data Protection Law (OUP, 2015), pp. 46-88. 
111 In practice, conflicts between the two objectives may arise, for example with regard to how Member 
States define the implementation of the rules or the exceptions that can be invoked . See e.g. case C-73/07 
Tietosuojavaltuutettu v Satakunnan Markkinapörssi OY, Satamedia [2008] ECR I-09831. 
112 Although the current analysis takes into account both of these instruments, for a comprehensive picture 
one should take into account the situation in different Member States. There are indeed many areas where 
Member States are given wide latitude, even under the GDPR, to implement EU data protection law. 
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opinions” by the advisory body called “Article 29 Working Party” (hereinafter 
“A29WP”), composed by representatives of different data protection authorities in 
Europe113, and which after entry into force of the GDPR will be replaced by a similar 
body with expanded competences - the European Data Protection Board. 
By way of introduction, it should be borne in mind that data protection law applies to the 
processing of personal data. This means that data processing entities will not be required 
to follow the rules set forth in the Regulation whenever the data being processed “does 
not relate to an identified or identifiable natural person” (in technical jargon, a “data 
subject”114) or is “rendered anonymous in such a way that the data subject is no longer 
identifiable”115. It follows that complete anonymization of the data collected would in 
principle represent a viable strategy for companies to engage in limited profiling 
informing a company’s strategies, to the extent that such profiling does not raise to a 
level of specificity enabling the identification of any particular individual116. However, 
recent studies of re-identification have shown that true anonymization is extremely hard 
to attain in a world of big and widely available data: simply stripping the data of some 
identifiers is unlikely to do the job117. Escaping the application of data protection rules 
requires the deployment of “state of the art” anonymization techniques, possibly 
involving a combination of multiple measures. Moreover, while these techniques 
preserve the ability to derive insights from aggregate data, they may lessen the utility of 
the datasets concerned to provide correlations between relevant attributes and observed or 
																																																								
113 One can question whether the same effect can be ascribed to the soft law produced by this body as with 
the various Guidelines and Notices in EU competition law, which the European Court of Justice has found 
to trigger legitimate expectations (see e.g. Joined Cases C-189, 202, 205, 208 & 213/02 Dansk Rørindustri, 
para. 223). Nevertheless, this paper proceeds on the assumption that such guidelines will be followed, to 
the extent they have not been superseded by the GDPR. 
114 See article 4, (1) GDPR. 
115 To make this determination, the Regulation focuses on “whether means are reasonably likely to be used 
to identify the natural person, account should be taken of all objective factors, such as the costs of and the 
amount of time required for identification, taking into consideration the available technology at the time of 
the processing and technological developments”. See Recital 26 GDPR.  
116 Importantly, such profiling may be used only in limited circumstances to take decisions based on 
automated processing that significantly affect individuals. See art. 22 GDPR, and the discussion in section 
3.3 below. 
117 See Paul Ohm, ‘Broken Promises Of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of Anonymization’, 
57 (2010) UCLA Law Review 1701,See also https://datafloq.com/read/re-identifying-anonymous-people-
with-big-data/228.  
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inferred behavior, which enable segmentation of population on the basis of common 
patterns.  
Recognizing the challenge, the Regulation addresses a half-baked form of anonymization, 
called “pseudonymization”, which consists of “the processing of personal data in such a 
manner that the personal data can no longer be attributed to a specific data subject 
without the use of additional information, provided that such additional information is 
kept separately and is subject to technical and organisational measures to ensure that the 
personal data are not attributed to an identified or identifiable natural person”118. This 
will be typically be the case for statistical research, which is defined as  “any operation of 
collection and the processing of personal data necessary for statistical surveys or for the 
production of statistical results” and presupposes that its results or the personal data used 
to obtain them are not used in support of decisions regarding any particular legal 
person119 . For all research, including the broad category of scientific research120 , 
pseudonymization is merely one of the possible technical and organizational measures to 
be adopted in order to ensure data minimization, where the ultimate goal is to have in 
place appropriate safeguards for the rights and freedom of the data subject 121 . 
Nevertheless, the Regulation is clear that, where possible, research purposes should be 
fulfilled anonymizing any further processing of the dataset122 . In return for these 
obligations, processing for research purposes benefits from a number of derogations, 
some of which directly applicable 123  while others depend on Member State 
implementation124. Additionally, if an organization adopts pseudonymization, it will be 
exempted from compliance with a number of obligations under the Regulation, such as 
providing data subjects with access, rectification, erasure or data portability 
																																																								
118 See art. 4 (5). 
119 Recital 162 GDPR. 
120 The term is not defined by the Regulation but the examples provided refer to a wide range of scenarios, 
such as technological development and demonstration, fundamental research, applied research, and 
privately funded research. See Recital 159 GDPR.  
121 Article 89 (1) GDPR. 
122 Id.  
123 See articles 14 (information to be provided), 17 (right to erasure) and 21 (right to object) GDPR.  
124 In particular, the rights established in articles 15 (right to access), 16 (rectification), 18 (restriction of 
processing) and 21 (object), in accordance with article 89 (2) GDPR. 
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possibilities125. However, these exemptions do not relieve organizations from meeting all 
the remaining obligations, which include, most notably, the need to identify a legitimate 
legal basis for processing and the compliance with the principles of data protection: 
namely, the principles of lawfulness, fairness and transparency, purpose limitation, data 
minimization, storage limitation, and integrity and confidentiality126. The only exception 
to such principles is provided by article 5 (1) (b) and 5 (1) (e) for processing done for 
research purposes, and concerns the applicability of the principles of purpose limitation 
and storage limitation: given that it is not always possible to identify the purpose of 
processing in research, further processing and longer periods of processing are admissible 
when done solely for research purposes. This constitutes an important concession from an 
innovation standpoint, although conditional on the adoption of adequate safeguard 
measures in accordance with article 89 (1)127. Unfortunately, the absence of further 
details on the notion of appropriate safeguards for research purposes makes it difficult at 
present to assess the scope of application of the research exemption (i.e., what type of 
research and under what conditions), as that will largely depend on the national 
implementation of the GDPR. 
 
Leaving aside the special cases of anonymized data and processing for research purposes, 
the key hurdle for the permissibility of data-driven innovation under EU data protection 
law is the existence of a valid legal basis for processing. Data protection law sets out a 
permission-based regime for the processing of personal data: unlike competition law, 
where business activity is permitted unless specifically forbidden, the regime for data 
protection law is one of authorization: data processing is forbidden, unless specifically 
permitted by law. Entities intending to process personal data must therefore identify a 
																																																								
125 See art. 11. 
126 Most notably, the principles of data quality listed in articles 6 of the DPD and 5 of the GDPR. Such 
principles include lawfulness, fairness and transparency; purpose limitation; accuracy; data minimization; 
storage minimization; integrity and confidentiality. To these, the Regulation adds a general obligation of 
“accountability”, which implies the ability for each data controller to demonstrate compliance with all the 
above mentioned principles. See art. 5 (2) GDPR. 
127 In this respect, Recital 156 GDPR refers to technical and organizational measures aimed at minimizing 
the processing of personal data in pursuance of the proportionality and necessity principles. It also specifies 
that the processing of personal data for scientific purposes should comply with other relevant legislation, 
such as that on clinical trials.  
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legal basis justifying their processing, in addition to the other requirements imposed by 
data protection law. Consent of consumers to the processing of data for a specific purpose 
constitutes merely one of the possible justifications for “lawful processing128”. Aside 
from exceptional situations in which processing is necessary for the exercise of a public 
function, for the fulfillment of a legal obligation or to protect the vital interest of an 
individual, two frequently used grounds are available which may not be immediately 
ascertainable from the terms and conditions governing the relationship between a data 
subject and a “data controller” (i.e. the entity which defines the means and purpose of 
processing129).  
First, processing is lawful whenever it is “necessary for the performance of a contract to 
which the data subject is party, or in order to take steps at the request of the data subject 
prior to entering into a contract”130. This means that essentially any processing which is 
implicit and instrumental to the contract will not require an additional consent to that 
required for the establishment of the object of the parties’ agreement: an example often 
used is the use of one’s name and address for the delivery of an online purchase. Since 
innovation presumes an alteration of existing products, services or operations, the claim 
that a new processing of personal data is essential appears to be weak or difficult to 
maintain at best, if the contract could be previously established or performed in a 
satisfactory way without the use of such personal information. The interpretation of 
“necessity” by the Article 29 Working Party is quite stringent, and seems unlikely to be 
able to accommodate any collection or use of personal data that could not be reasonably 
inferred from the stated purpose of processing131. 
Second, and most importantly from an innovation perspective, processing can be justified 
if it is “necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or 
by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests for 
fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject”132. This caveat is slightly modified 
																																																								
128 See Article 7 of the DPD, and article 6 of the GDPR. 
129 See article 4, (7) GDPR. 
130 See art. 5 (b). 
131 Article 29 Working Party Opinion 06/14 on Legitimate Interest, pp. 16-17. 
132 See art. 6 (1) (f) GDPR. 
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under the GDPR, which extends it to the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of 
the data subject133, expanding the range of elements that may be balanced against the 
interests of the controller or third parties134. The “legitimate interest” ground undoubtedly 
constitutes an appealing alternative to consent for innovations that are difficult to predict 
at the beginning of a contractual relationship, and especially so after the GDPR has 
introduced a “freely given” requirement for consent, clarifying that it is insufficient to 
justify processing when there is a significant imbalance between the position of the data 
subject and the controller 135  and that utmost account will be taken whether the 
performance of a contract is conditional on the processing of personal data that is not 
necessary for the performance of the contract136. Thus, the legitimate interest offers the 
advantage to enable data controllers to do away with those stringent requirements of data 
subject permission, provided they can show any interest that is real (non speculative), 
sufficiently specific and “accepted by law”137, as long as they adopt safeguards which 
sufficiently protect the interests or fundamental rights of the data subject.  
At the same time however, the reliance on legitimate interest does not exempt the data 
controller from the need to declare that interest in order to ensure fair and transparent 
processing138, and to conduct the balance of that interest with the interests or fundamental 
rights and freedoms of the data subjects ahead of processing. This means that the more 
significant implication of relying on this ground for processing is the greater 
“responsibilization” of data controllers, who are accountable for their self-assessment on 
the adequacy of the balancing, in addition to being expected to adopt technical and 
organizational measures to ensure the continued adequacy of their processing139. Such 
																																																								
133 This is simply the correction of a mistake in transcription made with the DPD, as noted by the A29WP 
contrasting the official text in different languages. See A29WP, WP 217, p. 29. 
134 Article 6 (1) (f) GDPR also indicates that the weight rights or interests to be balanced is particularly 
important when the data subject is a child. 
135 Recital 43 GDPR. 
136 Article 7 (4) GDPR. 
137 See A29WP Opinion 06/14, supra note 131, p. 25. 
138 See articles 13 (1) (d) and 14 (2) (b) GDPR.  
139 This is a corollary of the principle of accountability established in article 5 (2) GDPR, which requires 
data controllers to be responsible for, and be able to demonstrate, compliance with the principles relating to 
the processing of personal data listed in article 5 (1) GDPR. See also Recitals 78 and 81 of the GDPR. 
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responsibilization aligns with the so called “risk-based approach” 140, according to which 
data controllers are required to adopt protective measures commensurate to the level of 
risk of harm to the rights and freedoms of the data subject arising from the data 
processing activities in question141. The calibration of the responsibilities of controllers 
on “the nature, scope, context and purposes of processing as well as the risks of varying 
likelihood and severity for the rights and freedoms of natural persons”142 implicates the 
emergence of a differentiated regime of compliance with data protection law, with 
enhanced transparency and administrative requirements for data controllers involved in 
high risk processing. 
 
The GDPR offers guidance on risk assessment by detailing the type of risks at stake 
(falling into the three categories of physical, material and non-material damage)143 and 
providing examples of high risks situations144. However, it does not dictate what level of 
																																																								
140 For an overview of the role of risk assessment in data protection and beyond, see Niels van Dijka, 
Raphaël Gellert, Kjetil Rommetveit, ‘A risk to a right? Beyond data protection risk assessments’ 32 (2016) 
2 Computer Law and Security Review 286. 
141 The GDPR builds the foundations for risk assessment and risk management by charging data controllers 
with obligations that are dependent on the level of risk of the activity they conduct: for example, those with 
high level of risk must make prior consultation with the DPA, who may decide to enjoin the conduct (see 
art. 36 GDPR). They are also required to notify both the DPA and the data subjects of any data breaches 
that are likely to result in a risk for the rights and freedoms of the individual, unless they have adopted 
appropriate organizational or subsequent measures to mitigate the risk, or the notification involves 
disproportionate effort (article 37 GDPR). 
142 Recital 89 and article 24 GDPR. 
143 In particular: “where the processing may give rise to discrimination, identity theft or fraud, financial 
loss, damage to the reputation, loss of confidentiality of personal data protected by professional secrecy, 
unauthorised reversal of pseudonymisation, or any other significant economic or social disadvantage; 
where data subjects might be deprived of their rights and freedoms or prevented from exercising control 
over their personal data; where personal data are processed which reveal racial or ethnic origin, political 
opinions, religion or philosophical beliefs, trade union membership, and the processing of genetic data, data 
concerning health or data concerning sex life or criminal convictions and offences or related security 
measures; where personal aspects are evaluated, in particular analysing or predicting aspects concerning 
performance at work, economic situation, health, personal preferences or interests, reliability or behaviour, 
location or movements, in order to create or use personal profiles; where personal data of vulnerable natural 
persons, in particular of children, are processed; or where processing involves a large amount of personal 
data and affects a large number of data subjects”. See Recital 75 GDPR. 
144 Namely “systematic and extensive evaluation of personal aspects relating to natural persons which is 
based on automated processing, including profiling, and on which decisions are based that produce legal 
effects concerning the individual or similarly significantly affect the individual”, “processing on a large 
scale of special categories of data,” and “systematic monitoring of a publicly accessible area on a large 
scale”. See Recital 91 GDPR. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3158008 
																														
	 33	
risks is acceptable, or what measures should be taken by data controllers to prevent or 
mitigate certain risks. In other words, the standards of risk management remain largely 
unexplored. One suggestion in that regard is that EU data protection law should adopt a 
precautionary approach, prohibiting certain operations unless the controller can provide 
evidence of the innocuousness of the practice in question 145 . While adopting a 
precautionary approach may be seen as in tension with the force of innovation146, such an 
approach would arguably be in line with the text and spirit of the GDPR when it comes to 
high-risk situations 147 . From this perspective, the role of codes of conduct and 
certification mechanisms will be crucial in providing data controllers with a minimum 
degree of legal certainty when undertaking such high-risk processing, by serving as 
parameters to demonstrate compliance148. 
A third and last possible avenue for data-driven innovation is to rely on the notion of 
“compatible use” in the further processing of legitimately acquired data. Despite the 
requirement of it to be “not incompatible” with the purpose(s) of the original processing, 
this notion leaves some room for creative interpretations. First, the purpose limitation 
principle has a specific exception for archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific 
or historical research purposes or statistical purposes, as long as Member States provide 
appropriate safeguards149. Thus, having legitimately acquired the data may be sufficient 
to allow any scientific or historical research, and even a statistical analysis for business 
purposes. Second, and equally importantly, article 6 (4) of the GDPR suggests that the 
assessment of compatibility with the original purpose(s) is rather flexible, where the 
further processing is not based on the data subject's consent or on a specific Member 
																																																								
145 Raphaël Gellert, ‘Data protection: a risk regulation? Between the risk management of everything and the 
precautionary alternative’ 5 (2015) 1 International Data Privacy Law, 3, 18. 
146 See for instance Adam Thierer, ‘Privacy Law's Precautionary Principle Problem’ 66 (2014) 2 Maine 
Law Review, 467; Tal Zarsky, ‘The Privacy–Innovation Conundrum’ 19 (2015) 1 Lewis & Clark Law 
Review, 115. 
147  See Article 29 Working Party, ‘Guidelines on Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA) and 
determining whether processing is “likely to result in a high risk” for the purposes of Regulation 2016/679’ 
(WP 248 rev.01, 4 October 2017). See also art 22 GDPR discussed in section 3.3. below, establishing that 
an additional layer of safeguards applies for automated decisions which significantly affect individuals. 
148 See art. 24 (3) GDPR. 
149 See art. 6 (1) (b) DPD and 5 (1) (b) GDPR; and art. 89 GDPR. In particular, Recital 29 requires that 
such safeguards “rule out the use of the data in support of measures or decisions regarding any particular 
individual”. 
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State law150. In particular, the exercise takes into account the following criteria: 
(a) any link between the purposes for which the personal data have been collected and the 
purposes of the intended further processing; (b) the context in which the personal data 
have been collected, in particular regarding the relationship between data subjects and the 
controller; (c) “the nature of the personal data, in particular whether special categories of 
personal data are processed, pursuant to Article 9” (special categories of data), “or 
whether personal data related to criminal convictions and offences are processed, 
pursuant to Article 10”; (d) the possible consequences of the intended further processing 
for data subjects; and (e) the existence of appropriate safeguards, which may include 
encryption or pseudonymisation. 
In practice, this assessment consists of an open-ended balancing, closely resembling the 
exercise conducted by data controllers to determine whether they have a valid legitimate 
interest151. Those two balancing exercises will thus be conveniently dealt together in the 
following section. 
3.2. A closer look at the two key balancing provisions  
So far, we have seen the room available within data protection law to process data for the 
pursuit of research and development, concluding that the possible avenues are (1) 
anonymization; (2) research purposes; (3) legitimate interest; and (4) compatible use.  
The assessment of (1) typically involves the balancing of factors of technical nature, 
which will not be discussed here as it falls outside of legal competence. With regard to 
(2), one may recall that the balancing concerns the purposes of research, on one hand, and 
appropriate safeguards for the rights and freedoms of the data subject(s) on the other. 
Importantly, there is significant room for derogations from certain articles of the GDPR 
as long as this is necessary for the fulfillment of research purposes without serious 
impairment. This alleviates the burden weighing on the shoulder of researchers, who 
must in any event adopt appropriate safeguards and respect all principles of data 
																																																								
150 The specific Member State law must have been designed to attain one of the objectives listed in art. 23 
of the GDPR, which include national security, defence, law enforcement purposes (among others).  
151 See art. 6 (1) (f) GDPR and  7 (e) DPD. 
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protection, including being grounded on a legitimate legal basis. It will be remembered 
that processing for research purposes benefits from an exemption to the purpose 
limitation principle, however, which significantly softens the rigidity of the mechanisms 
designed around the preservation of the contextual integrity of consent and legitimate 
interest152. As a result, balancing will be required when further uses rely on those legal 
grounds, although it will be significantly facilitated. 
For this reason, and because it is not certain that innovation can always be channeled 
through a scientific process of research, it is important to examine the process for the 
establishment of (3) and (4), both of which involve the weighing and balancing of very 
similar factors. Formal guidance in this area was only recently provided by the A29 WP, 
through its Opinions 3/2013153 and 6/2014 154, and only in part incorporated into the 
GDPR. The former Opinion, with specific regard to the compatibility assessment of 
further processing, refers to the following factors:  
(a) the relationship between the purposes for which the data have been collected and the 
purposes of further processing;  
(b) the context in which the data have been collected and the reasonable expectations of 
the data subjects as to their further use;  
(c) the nature of the data and the impact of the further processing on the data subjects;  
(d) the safeguards applied by the controller to ensure fair processing and to prevent any 
undue impact on the data subjects.  
As is apparent, these factors are slightly different from those subsequently adopted in the 
aforementioned article 6 (4) of the Regulation155: namely, the latter version subsumed the 
notion of “reasonable expectations” of criterion (b) into the broader concept of the 
																																																								
152 Contextual integrity is used here to refer to the idea of preventing the breach of the reasonable 
expectations of the data subject at the moment of collection of personal data. For a more in-depth 
discussion of the role of contextual integrity in privacy law, see Helen Nissembaum, Privacy In Context: 
Technology, Policy, and the Integrity of Social Life (Stanford University Press 2010). 
153 Article 29 Working Party, Opinion 03/2013 on Purpose Limitation. 
154 Article 29 Working Party, Opinion 06/2014, supra note 131. 
155 See supra, section 3.3. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3158008 
																														
	 36	
“relationship between the data subjects and the controller”; and criterion (c) was divided 
in two parts, separating the nature of the data being processed from the impact on the data 
subject –and thereby clarifying that the latter does not necessarily depend (only) from the 
former). Although no criterion appears dispositive in the overall assessment, it is clearly 
the last element of the test which distinguishes the assessment from other types of 
balancing that are found in the law, including in the competition realm, for providing 
great latitude to data controllers to tilt the balance in favor of compatibility. The A29WP 
identified a number of safeguards that can be aptly used to that end: first of all, a 
necessary (but not always sufficient) condition towards ensuring compatibility is to re-
specify the purposes. An additional notice to the data subjects and giving an opportunity 
to allow them to opt-in or opt-out is a second type of safeguard that may be required in 
certain situations156. In the extreme, one could also imagine a situation where the balance 
in the compatibility assessment weighs favor of incompatibility, but the request of a 
specific separate consent helps to compensate for the further purpose. Finally, the 
A29WP referred to an additional element which, depending on the situation and thus the 
type of concern arising from further use, may contribute to rebalancing the assessment in 
favor of compatibility: the adoption of technical and organizational measures aimed to 
attain the goals of data security (in particular, availability, integrity, and confidentiality of 
the data) and data protection (in particular transparency, isolation 157  and 
intervenability158). Although this list is not exhaustive, it provides key benchmarks not 
only for the self-assessment of data controllers, but also for subsequent measures that can 
be adopted or imposed to “normalize” a situation of violation of data protection 
principles.  
The test conducted to identify a legitimate interest and balancing it with the interests of 
the data subject is slightly more elaborated. Once again, the A29WP does not provide 
exhaustive guidance, rather highlighting its focus on the necessity and proportionality of 
the interference with the data subjects’ rights or interests. On one end of the scale, 
																																																								
156 See Opinion 03/2013, supra note 153, p. 26.  
157 Isolation refers to the “adequate governance of the rights and roles for accessing personal data”. See 
Article 29 Working Party  Opinion  05/12 on Cloud Computing, p. 16. 
158 Intevenability refers to the ability of the data subject to to manage the data in terms of, e.g., access, 
deletion or correction of data. 
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significant weight is attributed to the pursuit of an interest that pertains to a wider 
community (as opposed to merely the data controller), or which meets “cultural and 
societal expectations - even when not reflected directly in legislative or regulatory 
instruments”159. On the other end of the scale, the impact on the data subject is 
considered focusing on the nature of the data processed, the way in which it is being 
processed (e.g., the scale at which it is made available and whether it is combined with 
other data), and importantly, the reasonable expectations of the data subject 160 . 
Reasonable expectations play a pivotal role in determining the risks associated with the 
unauthorized use or disclosure of data, which explicitly include intangible harms “such as 
the irritation, fear and distress that may result from a data subject losing control over 
personal information, or realising that it has been or may be misused or compromised161”. 
It is therefore unnecessary to identify a concrete “theory of harm” to invoke the breach of 
a reasonable expectation preventing reliance on article 6 (1) (f) DPD: in line with the 
risk-based approach, it will be sufficient to point to the intrinsic risk posed to the rights 
and interests of the data subject by a certain type of processing. However, at the same 
time it should be noted that the determination of “reasonable expectations” is specifically 
linked to “the status of the data controller, the nature of the relationship or the service 
provided, and the applicable legal or contractual obligations (or other promises made at 
the time of collection)”162. This suggests that the contractual relationship between data 
controllers and data subjects will be closely observed to determine the bounds of 
“reasonable expectations”, enabling data controllers to contractually shape their ability to 
rely on legitimate interest, at least to a significant extent163.  
Finally, in line with the analysis conducted for the compatibility assessment of further 
processing, the overall balance is heavily impacted by the existence of appropriate 
safeguard measures, which include: increased transparency; privacy by design; privacy 
impact assessments; extensive use of anonymization techniques; data portability; 
																																																								
159 Opinion 06/14, supra note 131, p. 35. 
160 Id., p. 24. 
161 Id., p. 37. 
162 Id., p. 40. 
163 It is arguable however that relative factors such as the market power of the data controller and the 
vulnerability of the data subject could play a significant role in this determination, potentially sufficient to 
override the expectations created through the contractual agreement.  
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unconditional right to opt-out; and technical and organizational measures to ensure that 
the data cannot be used to take decisions or other actions with respect to individuals 
('functional separation'). Data controllers thus find in these exemplary safeguards a range 
of tools in order to address the data protection risks triggered by a specific type of data 
processing. Differently from the case of compatible use in further processing, however, 
such safeguards pertain to the balancing justifying the collection (and processing) of data 
in the first place, and cannot be introduced at a later stage in the data lifecycle. Risk 
management will therefore need to be conducted prior to collection, potentially leading a 
number of businesses to forego or delay innovative products or services to prevent or 
minimize risks. Once again, the risk management implications of the GDPR are not 
entirely clear, but the possibility to use adherence to codes of conduct as an indicator of 
compliance provides an incentive to align with the safeguards provided by those 
mechanisms. 
3.3 A cautionary note: the additional limitations on automated decision-making   
In addition to the framework described so far, it is important to bear in mind that data 
protection (and in particular, article 22 of the GDPR) provides an additional safeguard for 
human dignity and individual autonomy, which goes beyond the mere collection and use 
of a data subject’s personal data and extends protection to situations where individuals 
can be impacted by decisions based on fully automated processing, including profiling. 
“Profiling” is defined in the Regulation as “any form of automated processing of personal 
data consisting of the use of personal data to evaluate certain personal aspects relating to 
a natural person, in particular to analyse or predict aspects concerning that natural 
person's performance at work, economic situation, health, personal preferences, interests, 
reliability, behaviour, location or movements”164. Profiling is here used as an illustration 
of a situation where a decision may be based on the processing of data relating to one or 
more persons (those constituting the basis of the profile), yet such data is not sufficient to 
identify the individual subjected to the decision under the definition of personal data of 
article 4 of the GDPR.  
																																																								
164 See article 4, (4) GDPR. 
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Without this additional protection, data controllers would be able to take such decisions 
without having to worry about the GDPR. However, that could undermine individuals’ 
autonomy, which constitutes a fundamental value of EU data protection law165. In fact, 
the rationale for protection can be traced back to the explanatory memorandum of the 
equivalent provision under the Data Protection Directive (article 15), pointing to a 
concern that humans maintain the primary role in ‘constituting’ themselves instead of 
relying entirely on (possibly erroneous) mechanical determinations based on their “data 
shadow” 166. To prevent that situation, EU data protection law prohibits such decisions167 
except under limited circumstances, specifically if (a) they are based on the data subject’s 
explicit consent; (b) they are necessary for entering into a contract or performance 
thereof, or (c) they are authorised by Union or Member State law to which the controller 
is subject and which also lays down suitable measures to safeguard the data subject's 
rights and freedoms and legitimate interests168. To complement that, the article specifies 
that “suitable measures” must be adopted also in the case of (a) and (c), including at a 
minimum the right of the data subject “to obtain human intervention on the part of the 
controller, to express his or her point of view and to contest the decision”169.   
Although one could view the right to contest a decision as logically implying the prior 
right to obtain an explanation for that decision, this additional right contemplated in 
Recital 71 of the Regulation was not eventually enshrined in article 22 (3), generating 
some discussion as to whether data controllers are in fact subject to an obligation to 
																																																								
165	Paul Bernal, Internet Privacy Rights: Rights to Protect Autonomy (Cambridge University Press 2014) 
166 Explanatory text for Proposal for a Council Directive concerning the protection of individuals in relation 
to the processing of personal data, COM (90) 314 final – SYN 287, p. 29. See in this sense Isak Mendoza 
and Lee A Bygrave, ‘The Right not to be Subject to Automated Decisions based on Profiling’, in Tatiana-
Eleni Synodinou, Philippe Jougleux, Christiana Markou, Thalia Prastitou (eds.), EU Internet Law: 
Regulation and Enforcement (Springer 2017). 
167 Article 22 (1) GDPR. There has been some controversy regarding whether the “right not to be subject to 
a decision based solely on automated processing” established under this article confer a right to object to 
any such decisions, or rather amounts to a prohibition for data controllers to engage in such decisions in the 
first place. However, the Article 29 Working Party has recently settled the debate in favor of the latter 
interpretation in its Guidelines on Automated individual decision-making and Profiling for the purposes of. 
Regulation 2016/679, WP 251, Revised and Adopted on 6 February 2018.  
168 Article 22 (2) GDPR. 
169 Article 22 (3) GDPR. 
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provide an explanation for their decisions falling into this category170. Regardless of the 
binding nature of this obligation in relation to an individual measure, it must be 
recognized that the transparency requirements detailing the information and access rights 
of data subjects (in articles 13-15 of the GDPR) do entail an explanation of the logic 
involved in any automated decision-making, the significance and the envisaged 
consequences of such processing for the data subject171. This means that EU data 
protection takes a clear stance on innovation involving decisions based on automated 
processing, requiring the individual to be adequately informed and put in the condition to 
meaningfully participate. Although the interpretation of the concepts of “solely 
automated” and “significantly impact” will constrain the application of this provision, the 
Article 29 Working Party has favored a broad understanding of the prohibition172. This 
limits to a large extent the scope of permissible innovation by requiring data controllers 
to trade off efficiency with explainability, contestability and human intervention, and thus 
potentially preventing several types of unsupervised machine learning techniques that are 
often put forward as examples of data-driven innovation. 
4.! Mapping the interactions: could the two policies be united in diversity? 
As the previous sections have shown, competition and data protection law vastly differ on 
the space they assign within their rules to the pursuit of innovation. In particular, 
competition law is centered around the freedom to conduct business: while on the one 
hand it imposes general limits to that freedom by outlawing certain conducts, on the other 
hand it enables undertakings to overcome those limits through two main avenues. First, it 
identifies specific types of (economic) efficiencies that can be used to outweigh 
anticompetitive effects, imposing stringent conditions for such trade-offs to occur. 
																																																								
170 See for instance Sandra Wachter, Bernt Mittelstadt, and Luciano Floridi, ‘Why a right to explanation of 
automated decision-making does not exist in the General Data Protection Regulation’, International 
Data Privacy Law, 7(2):76–99, 2017. Lilian Edwards and Michael Veale, ‘Slave to the algorithm? Why a 
“right to an explanation” is probably not the remedy you are looking for’, preprint, ssrn:2972855 (2017); 
Bygrave, supra note 166.  
171  Andrew Selbst and Julia Powles, ‘Meaningful information and the right to explanation’, 7 (4) 
International Data Privacy Law, 233, 2017; Gianclaudio Malgieri and Giovanni Commande’, ‘Why a Right 
to Legibility of Automated Decision-Making Exists in the General Data Protection Regulation’, 
International Data Privacy Law, 7 (4) 243–265, 2017. 
172 A29WP, Guidelines WP251, supra note 167. 
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Second, it recognizes the possibility for undertakings to adopt reasonable and 
proportionate measures to protect their own commercial interests, which may include the 
pursuit of non-economic goals. However, it is important to note that in the case of 
coordinated conduct, the ‘objective justification’ line of defence in the pursuit of non-
economic objectives is only applicable if the concerned undertakings have been tasked by 
public authorities with that mandate.  
In contrast, data protection law is based on the idea of requiring a justification for the 
processing of personal data, given their potential impact on the rights and freedoms of 
data subjects, and to that end imposes the fulfillment of specific conditions upfront. Aside 
from the option to escape those conditions by using effective anonymization techniques 
and the possible exemption from certain requirements in case of scientific research 
activity, data-driven innovation can be accommodated under two different notions: 
“legitimate interest”, which implies no judgment on the type of interest pursued by the 
controller, so long as that interest is acceptable (i.e., legal) under the applicable law; and 
“compatible use” for further processing, which requires a link between the purposes for 
which the data have been collected and the purposes of the intended further processing. 
Both notions heavily depend on the context, including the nature of the data concerned, 
the potential impact on the data subject and the reasonable expectations of the data 
subject. In addition, it is important to bear in mind that data protection law does make a 
judgment call when it comes to innovations involving decisions based on automated 
processing which significantly impact individuals, prioritizing explainability, 
contestability and human intervention over efficiency. More generally, data protection 
requires any strive for efficiency to take a back seat to individual autonomy. This may 
limit some kind of innovation, but it permits and indeed promotes responsible and 
human-centric innovation in accordance with article 8 of the EU Charter.  
Furthermore, even if both competition and data protection law rely on some form of 
balancing for the introduction of innovation, the inquiry has a substantially different 
focus: in competition law, the balancing test is based on a counterfactual of the 
competitive process, which refers to the general market conditions in the absence of the 
conduct.  In data protection law, balancing revolves around the fulfillment of the 
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reasonable expectations of the data subject, which depend on the individualistic 
benchmark of his or her relationship with the data controller. While the former test is not 
able to account for the serendipity that often drives innovation in the big data era, the 
latter does little to identify and address situations of abuse triggered by market 
concentration. There are also a number of additional shortcomings under the tests used by 
competition law to incorporate data-driven innovation (DDI) and data protection 
innovation (DPI), as explained in the text above and illustrated in Fig. 1 below.  
 
 EFFICIENCY OBJECTIVE 
JUSTIFICATON 
101   Permitted: 
 
- Improvements in quality, 
productivity, and dynamic 
efficiencies. 
- Public policies framed in 
competitive terms. 
Permitted: 
 
- Trade-off between 
interbrand and intrabrand 
competition;  
- Necessary and 
proportionate measures in 
pursuit of commercial self-
interest. 
- Necessary and 
proportionate measures in 
pursuit of legitimate 
regulatory function. 
Obstacles:  
 
- DDI: Determinism.  
- DPI: quantifiability and 
measurability; "objective 
advantage" requirement for 
cross-market efficiencies 
Obstacles:  
 
- DDI: proportionality 
(indispensability). 
- DPI: “entrustment”. 
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(particularly where 
“advantage” implies the use 
of personal data for 
additional purposes). 
- Both: no elimination of 
competition. 
102 Legitimate: 
 
- Improvements in quality, 
productivity, and dynamic 
efficiencies. 
- Public policies framed in 
competitive terms. 
Legitimate:  
 
- Reasonable and 
proportionate measure in 
pursuit of commercial self-
interest (to improve price, 
quality, choice and 
innovation). 
- Reasonable and 
proportionate regulatory 
interest (provided no clash 
with competences defined 
by relevant regulations). 
Obstacles: 
 
- DDI: Determinism 
- DPI: quantifiability and 
measurability. 
- Both: no elimination of 
competition. 
Obstacles:  
 
- DDI: proportionality 
(indispensability). 
 
Fig. 1: Innovation Defences in Competition Law: Challenges for Data-Driven Innovation and Data 
Protection Innovation 
 
This list of shortcomings highlights how difficult it can be to escape liability under 
competition law for what would generally be perceived as welfare-enhancing data 
practices, that are legitimate under data protection if carried out with the appropriate 
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safeguards for data subjects. As corollary of this misalignment between competition 
defences and data innovation (in both of its manifestations), it is submitted that data 
innovation justifications may deserve some sort of special consideration, bringing to bear 
the weight attached by the European Union to the protection of personal data. The notion 
of “competition on the merits”, which emerged as a way to incorporate extra-competition 
rules into the concept of objective justifications, can in fact provide one trigger for such 
special consideration. Another mechanism could then be established for the assessment of 
data innovation as efficiency justification, in order as to overcome the problems of 
incommensurability and potentially neglect of privacy spillover. A specific form of 
cooperation could resolve these problems by building on the expertise of the data 
protection authority to assist the competition decision-maker, as well as take any further 
action deemed necessary for the pursuit of objectives that are squarely within its own 
mandate. 
Accordingly, it is submitted that a special procedure could be defined for cases where a 
defendant to a competition proceeding raises a data innovation justification, enablign the 
authority with the relevant expertise to consider not only the merits of the claim, but also 
any further action that it deems necessary to prevent negative spillovers on data 
protection. The framework would need to account for different forms of cooperation 
between a competition authority (CA) and a data protection authority (DPA), depending 
on the needs arising from the situation in question. The following Table (Fig. 2) provides 
a diagram of the possible interactions of privacy (P) and competition (C), whereby “+” 
indicates a practice whose net effect is to increase the intensity of the value at stake (P or 
C), “Ø” indicates a practice whose net effect neither increases nor decreases that 
intensity, and “-“ indicates a practice whose net effect is to decrease it. 
 
  P+  PØ P- 
C+ C+, P+  C+, PØ C+, P-  
Cooperation need: CA 
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tipping DPA. Consider DP-
friendly remedies? 
CØ CØ, P+  CØ, PØ CØ, P- 
Cooperation need: DPA 
tipping CA. Request 
preliminary ruling from 
CA to DPA on whether DP 
is infringed. 
C-  C -, P+ 
Cooperation need: 
CA to request 
DPA’s assessment  
of DP-related 
defences 
C -, PØ  
Cooperation need: 
DPA tipping CA. 
Consultation of CA 
for market definition 
and market power. 
Consultation for 
remedy.  
C-, P-  
Cooperation need: 
Coordination at remedy 
stage 
Fig. 2 : Interactions of Competition and Privacy 
Four possible scenarios (those with a shade of gray in the backdrop) should in principle 
be immune from raising concerns for either a CA or a DPA, much less trigger a tension 
between the two, and therefore do not call for coordination of their actions. The 
remaining five scenarios are more complex and raise different kinds of coordination 
problems, as discussed below. 
C-, P+: This is a case where a practice is put in place that improves the privacy, yet 
affects negatively competition in the relevant market(s). One example is adblocking, a 
mechanism conceived to promote an ecosystem with less invasive ads and without 
behavioral tracking, but which can also be abused to deny market access and extract rents 
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from websites and advertisers. Imagine a dominant browser vendor173committing not to 
serve any webpage which does not meet a self-proclaimed “Acceptable ads” policy, yet 
exempting from such policy the ads being served by the websites of its own and its 
affiliates174. The browser vendor could try to justify the exclusion of competitors by 
raising an efficiency defence, but this would require viewing the improved privacy as a 
quality that significantly affects competition for users’ attention among homogeneous 
types of websites (i.e. newspapers, social networks, etc.). This is a hard route to follow, 
not only due to the measurement issues, but also (and most importantly) because it 
appears that, at the present time, users are generally driven by the content of pages, rather 
than the associated amount of ads and trackers175. The browser company could then claim 
that the policy constitutes a reasonable commercial step to protect the fundamental right 
to data protection of its own users, which is endangered by the widespread use of pre-
formulated declarations of consent extracted from individuals through standardized 
Terms of Service. This defence would appear to be valid, to the extent that the ad blocker 
programme does not impose unreasonable or discriminate conditions for “whitelisting” 
(i.e., escape the application of the block). What is a competition authority to do in such 
cases? On the one hand, ignoring the potential benefit brought about by the programme 
would amount to disregarding the importance of the fundamental rights to privacy and 
data protection. On the other hand, acritically accepting the claimed efficiency would 
mean giving a free pass to undertakings using the public policy card, without adequate 
inquiry into the merits of such defence. For this reason, the most appropriate form of 
coordination would be to request the competent data protection authority to intervene and 
assess the legitimacy of innovation defences involving data protection, for example by 
examining the criteria and procedures established for “whitelising”, to ensure they are not 
																																																								
173 Currently, Chrome could be a good candidate for such position on mobile, where it reaches 40% (See 
https://www.netmarketshare.com/browser-market-share.aspx?qprid=2&qpcustomd=1). 
174 Such discriminatory behavior was recently found illegal in Germany under unfair competition law, 
irrespective of the fact that it  had been put in place by a non-dominant and non-integrated player. 
Specifically, Adblocking service provider Adblock Plus engaged in discriminatory treatment vis a vis the 
biggest German publisher Axel Springer. See ‘Adblock Plus’ business model ruled illegal by German 
court’ (Block Adblock, 26 June 2016) http://blockadblock.com/adblocking/germany-rules-adblock-plus-
business-model-is-illegal/ accessed 15 September 2016. 
175 So far, companies branded as offering privacy-preserving services in the space for social networks (Ello) 
and search engines (DuckDuckGo) have not exerted significant pressure on their competitors. 
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being used as a cover for exploitative or exclusionary practices.  
C-, PØ: This is a case where the relevant practice is prejudicial to competition, but 
indifferent for data protection purposes. As explained in section 2.3, the case law has 
spoken clearly: competition law does not owe deference to other laws, unless those laws 
already effectively preclude the undertaking from distorting competition. Outside those 
limited circumstances, there is technically no limit to the ability of competition 
authorities to enjoin or even mandate a certain data practice on competition grounds; 
however, at the practical level the range of actions available to the competition authority 
should be constrained by the limits imposed by the Charter of Fundamental Rights, 
including not to unduly interfere with the rights to privacy and data protection of the data 
subjects involved. If, for example, the European Commission were to order Google in the 
context of its Google Search investigation176 to enable advertisers to use the data of their 
campaigns with third parties, this would increase the sharing of data concerning 
identifiable individuals with more parties – which may be problematic from a data 
protection perspective. In order to avow negative spillovers, it is thus particularly 
important to have a mechanism for consultation between public authorities before the 
implementation of any impactful data-related remedy. This ensures that competition 
remedies do not ‘balance out’ the essence of the right to data protection for the 
achievement of economic welfare gains.  
At the same time, it is important for data protection authorities to appreciate the 
competitive implications of their decisions. This is even more delicate where the state of 
competition in the market contributes to determining the legality of a given practice 
under data protection law, for example the “significant imbalance” in determining the 
validity of consent177 or the market position of the controller claiming the existence of a 
“legitimate interest” for the processing of specific personal data178. For this reason, it 
should be also possible for the DPA to consult with the relevant competition authority 
																																																								
176  Case COMP/39470, see the documents available at 
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_39740> accessed 15 
September 2016. 
177 See supra note 135-136 and corresponding text. 
178 This assessment is relevant to determining the reasonable expectations of the data subject: see the 
Article 29 Working Party Opinion 04/14 referred to supra at note 162. 
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over the course of an investigation, at the very least in relation to market definition and 
the measurement of market power. 
CØ, P-: This is the opposite scenario, where a given practice is detrimental to privacy, 
but indifferent from a competition standpoint. That is, firms are not competing on 
privacy, but intervention of the competition authority could improve the situation of data 
subjects. Clearly, there is a problem of mandate here, preventing the authority from 
conducting an investigation or imposing a remedy merely on the basis of data protection 
considerations179. At the same time, failing to give sufficient attention to data protection 
concerns would be inconsistent with the positive obligations imposed by article 51 of the 
Charter180. For this reason, it is necessary to ensure that the case-team at a competition 
authority investigating such type of cases can “tip” their colleagues at the data protection 
authority that they have discovered what they think might be a data protection issue, and 
transfer the case-file where warranted. On a similar basis, to the extent that lawfulness 
under data protection law can be considered to justify a particular data practice (for 
example, on ground of efficiency), competition authorities ought to be able to request a 
preliminary ruling to the relevant DPA to appropriately gauge the data protection 
considerations in competition analysis. The mechanism of preliminary ruling can be 
relatively informal (e.g., not necessarily detailed) but it needs to be under a ‘fast-track’ 
procedure, for otherwise the administration of this mechanism could hamper the 
effectiveness of competition enforcement.  
 
C+, P-: Similar scenario to the one above, where a practice raises privacy concerns and 
has not only neutral, but even positive effects on competition. An example would be a 
doctor who decides to utilize the data of his patients, without appropriate consent, to 
																																																								
179 The only possible theory to justify addressing data protection considerations under those circumstances 
would be that the company engaged in the practices in question is unfairly taking advantage of the cost 
saving arising from non-complying with data protection law, thereby putting competitors at disadvantage. It 
is just worth noting that under this approach competition law could be invoked in multiple cases in which 
an undertaking does not comply with other laws, for example environmental protection or anti-
discrimination law.    
180 According to article 51, “The provisions of this Charter are addressed to the institutions and bodies of 
the Union with due regard for the principle of subsidiarity and to the Member States only when they are 
implementing Union law. They shall therefore respect the rights, observe the principles and promote the 
application thereof in accordance with their respective powers” (emphasis added). 
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create customized health insurance policies which he then offers to current and former 
patients. While this type of vertical integration may be efficient, it is also clear that 
competition authorities cannot simply condone breaches of data protection law for the 
sake of efficiency- and should thus be able to refer to a DPA any facts which they think 
raise concerns from a data protection perspective.  
 
C-, P-: Finally, there is a situation where one or more data practices are found to be 
detrimental not only to data protection, but also to competition. This may occur where the 
conduct prescribed under the two laws align, and in particular in the two following 
scenarios. First, most obviously, where there is an overlap of the prohibited conduct in 
the two legal fields in question: for example, this may happen when both data protection 
law and competition law require portability181of data which constitutes an essential 
facility, or was being used to eliminate competition in a secondary market. Secondly, 
where committing a given data protection violation also confers a competitive advantage 
over other undertakings: this may be simply because it allows the firm to save 
compliance costs, but it may also be due to the advantages derived from data-driven 
innovation, for example by enabling the firm to combine data across different sources 
without the necessary opt-in.  In this context, it is of utmost importance that any remedy 
imposed by the competition authority duly considers data protection, so as not to alter the 
balance of power between the affected data subjects and the data controller(s) in question. 
It thus calls for a mechanism of coordination between the two authorities at the remedy 
stage.   
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has discussed the role of innovation defences in EU competition analysis, 
critically reviewing the extent to which they are apt to accommodate the rising 
phenomenon of data innovation, which can be related to two different concepts: “data-
																																																								
181 According to newly established right to data portability, a data subject has under certain circumstances 
the right “to receive the personal data concerning him or her, which he or she has provided to a controller, 
in a structured, commonly used and machine-readable format and have the right to transmit those data to 
another controller without hindrance”. See article 20 GDPR.  
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driven innovation”, where big data is used to improve production or distribution and 
better match customer preferences; and “data protection innovation”, where market value 
is created through greater protection of data privacy. With regard to both concepts, it was 
concluded that competition law ought to be modernized by relaxing the stringency of the 
requirements for the success of those defences, in recognition of the intrinsic difficulties 
in predicting and quantifying efficiencies of this type. This is likely to be a major 
problem in the case of data-driven research, which effectively reverses the (deductive) 
process of scientific discovery by offering hypothesis on the basis of observation of 
empirical data. On the other hand, when it comes to data protection innovation, the main 
problem resides in the absence of benchmarks for the assessment of privacy benefits. In 
particular, the complexity of the analysis transcends the identification and quantification 
of unmet demand for greater data privacy; it also requires an explanation of the extent to 
which satisfying such demand outweighs any restriction of competition. In other words, 
competition law requires innovators to engage in a comparison of apples and oranges, 
and with particular stringency and exactitude when data innovation constitutes the 
proffered efficiency justification for coordinated behavior. The objective justification 
defense appears more likely to succeed for data innovation defenses, especially if raised 
in the context of unilateral conduct, but requires an examination of the merits of the 
extra-competition claims.  
 
The need to consider the merits of data protection justifications in competition analysis 
prompted a second inquiry, relating to the formal mechanisms within EU data protection 
law to take into account of data-driven efficiencies. This inquiry resulted in the 
identification of four possible avenues, the first of which (anonymization) reduces the 
potential of data-driven innovation, while the second (research purposes) depends on the 
ability to formalize one’s activity as “research” and on the adoption of “adequate 
safeguards” for the rights and interests of data subjects. The two remaining avenues 
revolve around a multi-factor and context-dependent balancing exercise. It was 
recognized that this generates a differentiated regime of permission for data-driven 
innovation, and that co-regulatory mechanisms such as code of conducts and certification 
represent a valuable tool to enhance legal certainty for data controllers in that regard. 
Finally, it was noted that article 22 of the GDPR provides a backstop against innovations 
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based on certain automated decisions that prioritize efficiency over explainability, 
contestability and human intervention. That limit and the different focus of the balancing 
exercise for the assessment of data-driven efficiencies fundamentally distinguish the 
nature of the innovation formally recognized in EU competition and data protection law. 
This suggests that the question of whether data protection considerations in competition 
analysis promote or hinder innovation is simplistic- it all depends on the notion of 
innovation that we look at. EU data protection law addresses different concerns than 
competition law; therefore, data protection considerations may on the one hand constrain 
the breadth of permissible innovation defenses in competition analysis, and on the other 
hand engender a different kind of innovation, that can be further stimulated through 
competition in the market. 
 
Having ascertained these differences and reviewed the obstacles to data innovation 
defenses in competition analysis, the chapter suggested that a special procedure could be 
established for a coordinated assessment of data innovation defenses in competition law. 
It then moved on to consider the possible intersections between competition and data 
protection issues in competition enforcement, identifying a more comprehensive 
framework for cooperation. On the basis of the nature of the effects (positive, neutral and 
negative) of a given practice on competition and on privacy, a competition authority can 
expect to be confronted with data protection considerations in different ways. The 
mapping presented nine possible scenarios, five of which raise challenges of inter-
institutional coordination. 
 
Ultimately, the substantive suggestion provided by this chapter is one of creating a 
specific mechanism for inter-institutional cooperation for specific cases involving data 
innovation defenses182, with a view to enabling competition and data protection agencies 
																																																								
182 This specific type of cooperation should be distinguished from the more general collaboration taking 
place in the Digital Clearinghouse, a framework for periodic meetings between contact points of authorities 
responsible for the regulation of digital services focusing on the following activities: (1) discussing (but not 
allocating) the most appropriate legal regime for pursuing specific cases or complaints related to services 
online, especially for cross border cases where there is a possible violation of more than one legal 
framework, and identifying potential coordinated actions or awareness initiatives at European level which 
could stop or deter harmful practices; (2) using data protection and consumer protection standards to 
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to strengthen –rather than undermine- each other’s function. While the contours of this ad 
hoc procedure were sketched alongside the five complex types of interactions identified 
in this chapter, the framework could incorporate additional considerations to ensure 
steady and effective cooperation in more specific contingencies. Obviously, the details of 
the special procedure would need to be formalized in specific rules, including at a 
minimum a rule that establishes a legal basis for the exchange of information between the 
relevant authorities. The recent introduction of such rule in Germany through an 
amendment of the German Competition Act183 is a welcome step towards effective and 
coherent enforcement of EU competition and data protection law, but other jurisdictions 
could define a more elaborated mechanism along the lines sketched above. In an era of 
big data and artificial intelligence, a regulatory framework failing to ensure coordination 
of competition and data protection enforcement runs contrary to the duty of EU 
institutions and Member States not only to respect and observe, but also to promote the 
fundamental rights and principles of EU law184. 
																																																																																																																																																																					
determine ‘theories of harm’ relevant to merger control cases and to cases of exploitative abuse as 
understood by competition law under Article 102 TFEU, with a view to developing guidance similar to 
what already exists for abusive exclusionary conduct; (3) discussing regulatory solutions for certain 
markets where personal data is a key input as an efficient alternative to legislation on digital markets which 
might stifle innovation; (4) assessing the impact on digital rights and interests of the individual of sanctions 
and remedies which are proposed to resolve specific cases; (5) generally identifying synergies and fostering 
cooperation between enforcement bodies and their mutual understanding of the applicable legal 
frameworks. See EDPS Opinion 8/2016 on coherent enforcement of fundamental rights in the age of big 
data of 23 September 2016, p. 15. 
183 At the time of writing, a bill was pending before the German parliament to amend article 50 of the 
German competition act (“Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen”) by extending the ability of 
competition authorities to exchange information beyond consumer protection agencies, and specifically 
with the Federal Commissioner for Data Protection and Freedom of Information and the Data Protection 
Commissioners of the federal states. The German government proposed a specific norm, § 50c (1) (1), for 
the cooperation of competition agency and data protection agencies as part of the Ninth Comprehensive 
Amendment of the German Act against Restraints of Competition, available 
at http://www.bmwi.de/BMWi/Redaktion/PDF/E/entwurf-eines-neunten-gesetzes-zur-aenderung-des-
gesetzes-gegen-wettbewerbsbeschraenkungen,property=pdf,bereich=bmwi2012,sprache=de,rwb=true.pdf. 
The norm, which entered into force in June 2017, provides that it is discretion of the authorities to 
exchange information that this is necessary for the performance of their respective functions, and use such 
information in their proceedings, as long as such information is not confidential (either as a business secret 
or because received by another authority for the application of article 101 or 102 TFEU). I am indebted to 
Rupprecht Podszun for bringing this amendment to my attention. 
184 See article 51 of the Charter, supra note 100. See also, distinguishing between negative and positive 
duties of competition authorities to respect and guarantee the effectiveness of data protection rights: 
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